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‘THE OVERSIGHT OF THE UK INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY 
SERVICES IN RELATION TO THEIR ALLEGED COMPLICITY IN 
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION’ 
 
Alice McDonald 
Abstract 
 
Allegations that the UK Secret Intelligence Service and Security Service were complicit in 
extraordinary rendition in the “War on Terror” raise concerns about the effectiveness of the 
existing UK intelligence oversight framework. This thesis analyses the response of oversight 
institutions to the allegations, and considers their ability to provide meaningful intelligence 
oversight, both individually and holistically. It considers an oversight framework based on 
the separation of powers, in which the state institutions have complementary roles.  
 
This thesis argues that the existing legislative oversight framework is outdated and that 
although due weight should be afforded to national security concerns, the current balance lies 
too far in favour of the executive. Both the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) and 
judiciary require greater powers to provide meaningful oversight. There is also an increasing 
role for civil society and transnational organisations, especially given the difficulties 
international intelligence cooperation poses for domestic intelligence oversight. 
 
The thesis considers: (1) the legislative oversight framework and law relating to extraordinary 
rendition; (2) the global intelligence landscape in which the UK intelligence and security 
agencies operate, and effect of increasing international intelligence cooperation; (3) executive 
oversight and the relationship between the executive and the UK agencies; (4) the structure 
and powers of the ISC, and its reports concerning extraordinary rendition; (5) the role of the 
judiciary within intelligence oversight, and judgments made in the context of extraordinary 
rendition; (6) the increasing role for non-traditional actors, including Non-Governmental and 
Transnational Organisations and the Press. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
There has never been a more apposite time at which to scrutinise the oversight of UK 
intelligence and security agencies. In an extraordinary few years, the actions and operations 
of the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (MI6 or SIS) and GHCQ have hit 
newspaper headlines as never before, in relation to allegations of the agencies’ complicity in 
the US led 'global spider's web'
1
 of extraordinary rendition.
2
 Discussions revolving around 
such allegations have largely focused upon the need for effective and public oversight and 
accountability of the intelligence and security services. This is because although the agencies 
operate within a difficult global environment, and against a variety of diverse threats,
3
 it is 
increasingly evident that a democratic society which upholds liberal values must, to some 
extent, be able to legitimately regulate the actions of its agencies.  
 
Although definitions of “extraordinary rendition” differ slightly, broadly speaking, it is 
agreed that the term refers to the practice of,  
 ‘forcibly transporting a person – usually alleged to be involved in terrorist activity – 
                                                          
1
 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving 
Council of Europe member states: second report’, Council of Europe: Strasbourg (Doc. 11302 rev.) 
(11/06/2007) <http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc07/edoc11302.pdf> 46. 
2
 See, amongst other similar articles, C Brown, ‘Rendition victim was handed over to the US by MI6’, The 
Independent, 14 December 2005 < http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/rendition-victim-was-
handed-over-to-the-us-by-mi6-519413.html> last accessed 05/02/10; I Cobain, ‘Britain ‘complicit in 
mistreatment and possible torture’ says UN’, The Guardian, 27 January 2010 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2010/jan/27/britain-complicit-possible-torture-un> last accessed 05/02/10; R Norton-Taylor, ‘MI5 faces 
crisis of credibility as torture denials are discredited’, The Guardian, 10 February 2010 <http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/world/2010/feb/10/torture-mi5-binyam-mohamed> last accessed 11/02/10; D Rose, ‘Revealed: MI5’s role 
in torture flight hell’, The Observer, 29 July 2007 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/jul/29/usa.politics> last 
accessed 11/02/10. 
3
 See ‘Chapter 2: The Challenges of Working within a Global Intelligence Landscape’ 28-48. 
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 from one country to another country without relying on the normal legal 
 processes…and for the purposes of subjecting them to interrogation and other forms 
 of treatment that include torture or cruel and degrading treatment.’4  
 
As discussed below, both the lack of due process associated with such a procedure, and use of 
torture, mean that it contravenes many international legal norms. However, despite the UK 
government’s insistence that there is no foundation in allegations of their complicity in the 
practice of extraordinary rendition,
5
 it has been alleged that the UK’s role went, 'far beyond 
that of a bystander.’6 This is difficult to corroborate, given the inherent secrecy in this area, 
and relative lack of court cases clarifying the UK government’s practice in this area. 
However, if the allegations are found to be true, they would cast a shadow upon the 
reputation of the UK intelligence and security agencies in a national and international arena.  
 
Given that the allegations of complicity in extraordinary rendition purport to implicate all 
actors within the intelligence process, including the executive, the challenge for the 
government lies in identifying any operational and policy failures which may have led to such 
allegations being promulgated, and ensuring that they are amended.
7
 Regardless of whether 
                                                          
4
 Professor P Sands, ‘Extraordinary Rendition: Complicity and its consequences’, (JUSTICE International Rule 
of Law Lecture 2006, Middle Temple Hall, London) 15 May 2006 <http://www.justice.org.uk/resources.php 
/197/extraordinary-rendition-complicity-and-its-consequences> last accessed 17/06/2011, para. 2. 
5
 See, for example, HC Deb 20 January 2006, vol 441, cols 37WS-38WS (Jack Straw); A Johnson, ‘Letters: 
Detention, torture and human rights’ The Guardian, 10 July 2009 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jul/10/letters-detention-human-rights> last accessed 07/02/2011; D 
Miliband and A Johnson, ‘Letters: Intelligence, torture and the courts’ The Guardian, 12 February 2010 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/12/intelligence-torture-and-the-courts> last accessed 07/02/2011. 
6
 R (on the application of Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] EWHC 
2048 (Admin), para. 88 (per Thomas LJ). 
7
 Schreier,F, ‘The Need for Efficient and Legitimate Intelligence’ in Born, H, and Caparini, M, (eds), 
Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., Hampshire 
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the allegations are true or not, the fact that they have arisen raises concerns about the extent 
to which the UK agencies are overseen by other independent branches of state, and how they 
may appear more democratically accountable than at present. In order to do this, it is 
necessary to critically analyse the oversight mechanisms which currently oversee the actions 
of UK agencies and, if necessary, reform them into a cohesive system in which the agencies 
are held as publicly accountable as existing public services and government departments.
8
  
 
However, given that the issues surrounding intelligence oversight are complex
9
 and 
necessarily revolve around the premise of retaining operational secrecy as far as possible
10
, it 
is impossible to model intelligence oversight in the same way as “ordinary” public services.11 
However, it is important to allow discussions about intelligence oversight as far as possible, 
and within an appropriate forum, given that this is an area of high national interest. In order 
to do so, there must be sufficient access to information to ensure that discussions are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2007), 39; Born suggests that this  is only possible if governments are willing to accept responsibility for 
failures, in ‘Parliamentary and External Oversight of Intelligence Services’ in Born and Caparini (eds.) 
Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants (Ashgate Publishing Ltd., Hampshire 
2007), 167. 
8
 Caparini, M, ‘Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States’ in Born & Caparini (n 
7), 3; see more especially, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), ‘Contemporary 
Challenges for the Intelligence Community’ (Backgrounders Series) 03/2006 
<http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=18415&nav1=5> last accessed 08/10/10. 
9
 Leigh, I, ‘More closely watching the spies: three decades of experiences’ in Born, H, Johnson, L, & Leigh, I, 
Who’s Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (1st edn, Potomac Books 2005) 7. 
10
 ‘Foreword by Ambassador Theodor H. Winkler and Ambassador Leif Mevik’ in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 
ix; Herman, M, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (CUP, Cambridge 1996), xii; Treverton, G, ‘Reorganizing 
U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options’ RAND Corporation Monograph Series MG-767-DHS, 
Homeland Security Program and the Intelligence Policy Centre, Santa Monica 2008 
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG767/> last accessed 09/10/10, 103; Eminent Jurists’ Panel, 
Assessing Damage, Urging Action (Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and 
Human Rights 2009) 68. 
11
 Caparini in Born & Caparini (n 7), 18. 
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informed,
12
 and do not unnecessarily sensationalise the issues. The reports of the Intelligence 
and Security Committee (ISC), court judgements and media reports, are largely responsible 
for informing the debate on intelligence oversight at present, although their authoritativeness 
is somewhat limited by the restrictions upon their content and, in relation to the courts, the 
openness of their procedure, as is discussed in this thesis. 
 
An effective model of intelligence oversight is one based upon the constitutional separation 
of powers and implements different levels of oversight involving state and non-state actors 
with complementary, but not similar, powers.
13
 The oversight framework in the UK follows 
this model by balancing the respective roles of the executive, legislature and judiciary, as the 
three branches of the state. In theory, therefore, the executive is involved in overseeing and 
authorising the agencies’ actions, the legislature seeks to provide legal limits within which 
they must operate, and the judiciary subsequently reviews any purported wrongdoing. By 
doing so, it prevents any possibility of their individual use of excessive authority within 
intelligence, and provides agencies with the independence from party politics. This is 
necessitated by their continuing and future role in securing the state’s interests.14  
 
As discussed throughout this thesis, in practice the roles of the executive, legislature and 
                                                          
12
 Schreier in Born & Caparini (n 7) 44; Gill, P, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal 
Democratic State (1
st
 edn., Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London 1994), 253; Gill, P, ‘The Politicization of 
Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq’ in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9), 15. 
13
 Caparini in Born & Caparini (n 7) 23. 
14
 Born, H & Leigh, I, ‘Chapter 5: Democratic accountability of intelligence services’ in Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2007, Armaments, Disarmament and International 
Security (38
th
 edn, OUP 2007)197-198; Caparini in Born & Caparini (n 7) 7-8; Lindsay, K, The British 
Intelligence Services in Action (Dunrod 1980) 272; Gibson, S, ‘In the Eye of the Perfect Storm: Re-Imagining, 
Reforming and Refocusing Intelligence for Risk, Globalisation and Changing Societal Expectation’ (2005) Risk 
Management 7(4) 23-41, 31. 
10 
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judiciary are not as clearly delineated as the separation of powers theory dictates. However, if 
all involved parties are endowed with effective authority by which to truly hold agency 
practices to account, cooperate effectively, and enforce sanctions where necessary,
15
 as 
discussed, then there is reason to believe that such a system may be successful. It is also 
increasingly important to recognise the growing role of civil society within intelligence 
oversight, given the mobilisation of the public, civil society organisations and the media, in 
respect of publicising allegations of extraordinary rendition.
16
 The challenge of ensuring 
effective oversight must therefore be approached from the understanding that ‘oversight is a 
process, not an event.’17 It will take time for the actors within intelligence oversight to inhabit 
their new roles and exercise their powers appropriately and confidently. In order to facilitate 
such developments, any recommendations must be implemented with long term objectives, 
rather than in response to the specific allegations in question.
18
 For this reason, proposals of 
specific legislation criminalising complicity in extraordinary rendition are short sighted and 
will have limited long term effect.
19
   
 
This thesis will therefore analyse the current oversight framework of the UK intelligence and 
security services in relation to recent allegations of their complicity in extraordinary 
rendition. It will consider how the existing formal mechanisms of oversight have reacted to 
                                                          
15
 Caparini in Born & Caparini (n 7) 8; Schreier in Born & Caparini (n 7) 42. 
16
 Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the challenge of security networks’ (2009) Rev. Int’l 
Studies 35(4) 929-941, 940. 
17
 Schreier, F, Fighting the Pre-Eminent Threats with Intelligence-Led Operations (DCAF Occasional Paper 16, 
2009), 108. 
18
 As a contrast, consider the circumstances in which the current legislative framework was formulated, 13-21. 
19
 See proposals by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition; ‘Extraordinary Rendition: 
Closing the Gap: A Proposal to Criminalise UK Involvement’ 11/05/2009 <http://www.extraordinaryrendition.  
org/index.php/component/docman/doc_details/216-extraordinary-rendition-closing-the-gap> last accessed 
25/09/2011, 127-133. 
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such allegations, and how well placed they have been to do so in terms of their structure and 
powers. This introductory chapter will include a section outlining the current oversight 
mechanisms, as set out by the relevant legislation. It will also consider the domestic and 
international legal obligations surrounding the issue of complicity in extraordinary rendition, 
in order to provide context to the subsequent discussions. The second chapter will then 
concentrate on the operational context in which the agencies collect and analyse intelligence. 
Relevant considerations here include the globalisation of security threats, the technological 
revolution, the blurring of agency boundaries, the internal regulation of the agencies, and 
most importantly, the growth of international intelligence cooperation. This last development 
truly blurs the boundaries between law, intelligence and international relations, and has wide 
implications for the ability of oversight mechanisms to perform their functions of review. 
 
In chapters 3 – 5, this thesis will consider the response of the executive, parliamentary and 
judicial branches of state, in their respective forms of oversight mechanisms, to allegations of 
agency complicity in extraordinary rendition. Chapter 3 begins with an analysis of the 
executive's role in the oversight process, in terms of its proper relationship with the 
intelligence and security agencies, use of the principle of ministerial responsibility, and 
previous policy regarding alleged complicity in extraordinary rendition. Chapter 4 then 
moves onto the role of the ISC as a mode of parliamentary scrutiny of the relevant agencies. 
Further to merely considering the statutory role and powers of the ISC, it is also essential to 
consider how the committee has asserted its powers in practice, in terms of its legal mandate. 
In order to do this, one must look closely at the ISC's recent reports, especially those relating 
to the treatment of detainees overseas
20
, and allegations of complicity in rendition
21
.  
                                                          
20
 ISC, ‘The handling of detainees by UK Intelligence Personnel in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq’ 
(Report) (March 2005) Cm 6469. 
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Chapter 5 will focus on the courts and judiciary as forms of intelligence oversight, both in 
terms of the statutory Investigatory Powers' Tribunal and Intelligence Commissioners, and 
also in relation to the treatment of intelligence and security related issues within the “normal” 
judicial process. Recent cases, including Al Rawi and Others
22
, heard in the Supreme Court, 
and Mohamed (No. 2)
23
, before the Court of Appeal, have raised important questions as to the 
extent to which “incidental” judicial oversight should defer to the executive over intelligence 
and security issues. At the same time, procedural rules and processes, such as the closed 
material and special advocate procedure have been important in accommodating issues of 
intelligence within the UK legal system.  
 
Chapter 6 will look at the contribution of non-traditional oversight mechanisms, including the 
media, NGOs, and transnational bodies, to effective intelligence oversight. This is an aspect 
of oversight which has traditionally been somewhat neglected by academics. However, the 
fervour with which numerous NGOs and investigative journalists drove the debate on 
extraordinary rendition demonstrates the importance of analysing their role in informing and 
monitoring public perception and understanding of the intelligence and security services. The 
chapter will therefore examine the advantages, and limitations, of their contribution to 
intelligence oversight, in order to identify how they might more successfully and effectively 
oversee the agencies.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
21
 ISC, ‘Rendition’ (Report) (July 2007) Cm 7171. 
22
 Al Rawi and others v Security Service (JUSTICE and others intervening) (‘Al Rawi and others’) [2011] UKSC 
34; [2011] 3 W.L.R. 388. 
23
 R (on the application of Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (‘Mohamed 
(No. 2)’ (CA) [2010] EWCA Civ. 65; [2011] Q.B. 218. 
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Having considered the above issues, this thesis will conclude with a summary of the 
performance of oversight mechanisms in relation to extraordinary rendition, and the lessons 
which this has highlighted in terms of the future of intelligence oversight in general. Due to 
the constraints of time, and word limit, this thesis will not consider developments in 
intelligence oversight past summer 2011. 
 
   
1.1 The Legislative Oversight Framework of the UK Intelligence and Security Services 
 
Although the historical background of the intelligence and security agencies has been 
previously dealt with to a far greater extent than possible here,
24
 it is fitting to begin this 
thesis with a brief account of the events leading to the creation of the ‘piecemeal’25 legislative 
framework which currently regulates the oversight of the UK agencies. Prior to the 1980s, 
responsibility for the intelligence and security services was based upon the Crown 
prerogative, rather than specific legislation,
26
 and therefore the agencies operated within a 
quasi-secret no man’s land, free from public scrutiny of their actions.27 In this sense, it is 
therefore certainly true that traditionally, ‘intelligence was the last taboo of British politics.’28   
                                                          
24
 Most notably by Andrew, C, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (Penguin Books, 
London 2009). See also Dorrill, S, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations (Fourth Estate, London 2000); Gill, 
P, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State (n 12); Herman, Intelligence Power 
in Peace and War (n 10); Jones, R, Reflections on Intelligence (Heinemann, London 1989); Lindsay (n 14); 
Lustgarten, L, & Leigh, I, In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy (OUP, Oxford 
1994). 
25
 Gill, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the challenge of security networks’ (n 16) 929. 
26
 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom’ in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 
79. 
27
 Andrew (n 24) 754; Starmer, K, ‘Setting the record straight: human rights in an era of international terrorism’ 
(2007) E.H.R.L.R. (2) 123-132, 128.  
28
 Ibid (Andrew) 753. 
14 
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The emergence of intelligence oversight as a pressing political issue was prompted by 
revelations and scandals involving agency officials during the 1980s; in a domestic context, 
for example, the conviction of Michael Bettany for passing information to Soviet agents, and 
the publication of Spycatcher by former agent Peter Wright, brought agency malpractice into 
the public domain, and emphasised the government’s desire to retain secrecy within the realm 
of intelligence.
29
 In an international context, cases taken to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), brought the actions of the UK agencies under the scrutiny of a wider judicial 
forum. In Malone v UK
30
 the ECtHR’s decision that telephone tapping was unauthorised in 
domestic law led to the Interception of Communications Act 1985, the UK’s first intelligence 
legislation.
31
 This proscribed a legal framework for telephone tapping and mail opening
32
 and 
established both a complaints tribunal
33
 and a Commissioner to review the issuance of 
warrants authorised by the Home Secretary.
34
 Whilst Andrew credits the ECtHR in Leander v 
Sweden
35
 with emphasising that intelligence agencies’ powers must be “sufficiently clear”36, 
the decision in Hewitt and Harman v UK
37
, relating to the UK agencies’ use of surveillance 
powers, had a similar effect. In this way, the ‘European dimension’ was very influential in 
terms of provoking legislative oversight provisions
38
, and in response, the UK government 
                                                          
29
 Ibid 754 – 767, for a comprehensive account of events during this period.  
30
 Malone v United Kingdom  (1984) 7 EHRR 14. 
31
 For a more detailed analysis than possible here, see Lloyd, I, ‘The Interception of Communications Act 1985’ 
(1986) Mod. L. Rev. (49) 86-95. 
32
 s2 Interception of Communications Act 1985. 
33
 Schedule 1, ICA 1985. 
34
 s8 ICA 1985. 
35
 Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433. 
36
 Andrew (n 24) 760. 
37
 Harman and Hewitt v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 657. 
38
 Leigh & Lustgarten, ‘Legislation: The Security Service Act 1989’ (1989) Mod. L. Rev. (52) 801, 803; echoed 
by Andrew (n 24) 756-760. 
15 
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introduced legislation implementing the minimum level of oversight required by the 
ECtHR.
39
 However, given the speed with which the UK responded to the ECtHR’s decisions 
in Malone v UK and Hewitt v Harman v UK, the resulting legislation created an oversight 
system which has been termed, ‘unsatisfactory [and] compartmentalised’.40 These cases were 
bound by the lack of explicit legislative basis for the UK intelligence and security agencies
41
, 
and thus went to the very heart of the agencies’ ability to operate without external control.  
 
The resulting legislation came in the form of the Security Service Act 1989
42
, followed by the 
Intelligence Services Act 1994. These pieces of legislation put MI5 and MI6 on a statutory 
footing for the first time
43
 and outlined the respective functions of the agencies. Section 1(2) 
SSA 1989 outlines the Security Service’s functions as below;  
‘the protection of national security and, in particular, its protection against threats 
from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign 
powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary 
democracy by political, industrial or violent means.’44 
 
Similarly, according to s1(1) ISA 1994, the functions of the Secret Intelligence Service are;  
‘(a) to obtain and provide information relating to the actions or intentions of persons 
outside the British Islands; and 
                                                          
39
 Ibid (Leigh & Lustgarten) 822. 
40
 Gill, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the challenge of security networks’ (n 16) 938. 
41
 Leigh in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 4. 
42
 Andrew (n 24) 756-760. 
43
 s1 SSA 1989; s1(1) ISA 1994. 
44
 s1(2) SSA 1989. See also s1(3), and amendments. 
16 
Word Count: 40,214 inclusive of abstract and footnotes, excluding bibliography 
(b) to perform other tasks relating to the actions or intentions of such persons.’45 
 
The ISA 1994 also attempts to limit the exercise of the above functions to situations which 
are necessary;  
‘(a) in the interests of national security, with particular reference to the defence and 
foreign policies of Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom; or 
(b) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom; or 
(c) in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime.’46 
 
However, the extent to which this constrains the agency’s actions is questionable given that 
the situations in which SIS may act are drafted very widely in order to allow for a variety of 
situations; as Wadham notes, for example, the expression “national security”, ‘can mean 
whatever the Government of the day chooses it to mean.’47 Since neither ss1 SSA 1989 nor 
ISA 1994 proscribe actions which the agencies may or may not employ in the course of their 
operations, both Leigh and Starmer have criticised them as not sufficiently specific.
48
 Further, 
Leigh and Wadham suggest that a more limited statutory definition of the agencies’ roles, 
listing specific prohibited actions, would be more appropriate and successful at keeping in 
check the powers of the security service.
49
 Although the relative vagueness of ss1 SA 1989 
and ISA 1994 allows the agencies to respond flexibly to new and emerging threats, the 
arguments of these academics are influential if one considers that such threats, might be more 
                                                          
45
 s1(1) ISA 1994. 
46
 s1(2) ISA 1994. 
47
 Wadham, ‘Legislation: The Intelligence Services Act 1994’ (1994) 57 Mod LR 916, 919. 
48
 Leigh in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 94-5; Starmer (n 27) 129. 
49Leigh & Lustgarten, ‘Legislation: The Security Service Act 1989’ (n 38) 809; Wadham (n 47) 918-9. 
17 
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effectively resolved by easy reference to legally based general guidance, which would 
entrench the agencies’ domestic and international legal obligations and prevent wrongful 
decision-making.
50
 The vagueness with which the agencies’ functions are termed therefore 
detracts from the benefit in their being enshrined in legislation.  
 
Section 2 of both the SSA 1989 and ISA 1994 also entrench the role of Director-General of 
the Security Service, and Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service
51
, which is significant if one 
considers the traditional secrecy which surrounded these positions.
52
 This development also 
clearly enforces that the agencies operate according to a clear power hierarchy, with a line of 
control leading to the heads of the agencies. However, the fact that both agency heads also 
have a direct right of access to the Prime Minister
53
, may raise questions about the proximity 
of the agencies to the executive
54
; even if these are without foundation, the mere perception 
that the agencies may be influenced by party politics could undermine their public 
independence. 
 
Section 4 SSA 1989 established the role of the Security Service Commissioner, who reviews 
the Secretary of State’s authorisation of warrants relating to interferences with property. This 
was mirrored by s8 ISA 1994, in the form of a Commissioner performing this role in relation 
to the Intelligence Service’s activities. These positions were consolidated by the Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which changed their titles to the Interception of 
                                                          
50
 See ‘Chapter 2: The Globalised Intelligence Landscape’, 28-48. 
51
 s2 SSA 1989; s2 ISA 1994. 
52
 See, for example, Andrew (n 24) 774-778. 
53
 s2(4) SSA 1989; s2(4) ISA 1994. 
54
 See ‘Chapter 3: The Role of the Executive’, 49-62. 
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Communications Commissioner
55
, and the Intelligence Services Commissioner
56
. The former 
monitors the authorisation of warrants relating to interception methods
57
, whilst the latter 
reviews the issuance of warrants relating to intrusive surveillance and interference with 
property.
58
 Each Commissioner’s remit therefore cover both agencies, insofar as they require 
warrants for the specified activities. The agencies must disclose all relevant information to 
the Commissioners
59
, who report annually to the Prime Minister, according to ss58(4) and 
60(2) RIPA 2000. Although the Commissioners therefore enjoy considerable access to 
information, they work part-time. This necessarily mean that their approach cannot be as 
thorough as would be desirable, given that the Commissioners’ reports are based upon 
conclusions drawn from reviewing a sample of warrants actually granted, and from limited 
auditing visits to the agencies in questions.
60
 
 
Both SSA 1989 and ISA 1994 established Tribunals for the investigation of complaints about 
the agencies
61
, which were consolidated into the single Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) 
by s65(Part IV) RIPA 2000. The IPT’s powers under RIPA 2000 are wide, and purport to 
cover, ‘interception of communications; communications data; intrusive surveillance; 
directed surveillance; interference with property; covert human intelligence sources; 
                                                          
55
 s57 (Part IV) RIPA 2000. 
56
 s59 (Part IV) RIPA 2000.  
57
 s57(2) RIPA 2000. 
58
 s59(2) RIPA 2000. 
59
 s58(1) and s60(1) RIPA 2000. 
60
 See, for example, Lustgarten & Leigh, In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy (n 
24) 63; although the authors talk about the role of Commissioner as established by the ICA 1985, the same 
criticisms are equally valid for the later legislation. 
61
 s5 and Schedule 2 SSA 1989; s9 and Schedule 2 ISA 1994. 
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investigation of protected electronic information.’62 However, the fact that the IPT seeks to 
accommodate intelligence within a specialised forum heavily dictates its procedure; s69(1) 
RIPA 2000 holds that the Secretary of State may determine the rules by which the IPT 
operates, including with regards to the evidential requirements and burden of proof
63
, the 
level of information the complainant is given about the reasons for the conduct in question
64
, 
and its ability to proceed without the presence of certain persons (including the 
complainant).
65
 Although the Tribunal therefore has access to all the relevant information it 
needs under s68(6)-(7) RIPA 2000, s68(4) holds that it is under no obligation to give reasons 
for its decisions.
66
 This raises the perception that the IPT’s process is not sufficiently 
independent of the executive, through the Secretary of State’s involvement in the IPT 
process. Furthermore, it also raises questions about the extent to which the Tribunal is a form 
of open justice by which a complainant may have its rights upheld. Although the IPT 
publishes decisions it considers “key rulings”67, this itself implies that the IPT reaches a 
value-based decision about which rulings are “key”, and should be reported, and which are 
not. The subjectivity of such an approach does not promote certainty for those wishing to 
make a complaint to the IPT about the UK agencies. The IPT’s role as a decision-making 
body will be analysed in further detail in this thesis.
68
  
 
                                                          
62
 ‘What the Tribunal can Investigate’ <http://www.ipt-uk.com/default.asp?sectionID=1> last accessed 
19/05/2011. 
63
 s69(2)(g) RIPA 2000. 
64
 s69(4)(a) RIPA 2000. 
65
 s69(4)(b) RIPA 2000. 
66
 s68(4) RIPA 2000. 
67
 ‘Key IPT Rulings’ <http://www.ipt-uk.com/sections.asp?pageID=73&sectionID=19&type=rulings> last 
accessed 20/02/2012. 
68
 See ‘Chapter 5: The role of the judiciary’ 90-111. 
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The most significant achievement of the ISA 1994 is that s10(1), ‘establishes for the first time 
a system of parliamentary accountability for all three services’69, in the form of the 
Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC).
70
 The Committee comprises nine Members of 
Parliament, none of whom can be serving Cabinet Ministers.
71
 It must make an Annual 
Report, which it presents firstly to the Prime Minister
72
; s10(6)-(7) ISA 1994 holds that only 
after suitable redactions are made is the report presented to Parliament, before publication. 
The ISC also has only limited access to information relevant to the publication of its reports, 
since it may not request specific documents
73
, and may have information requests refused on 
the basis that the material it seeks it ‘sensitive’.74 For such reasons Wadham argues that, ‘[i]n 
general, the provisions relating to the Committee imply that its members cannot be trusted 
with sensitive information.’75 Although these rules were envisaged as a means by which to 
safeguard the secrecy of operational details and identity of intelligence officers, the ability of 
the ISC to function effectively as a means of oversight rests upon it being sufficiently 
informed about the events about which it seeks to report. 
 
By analysing the background of the existing legislative intelligence oversight framework it is 
arguable, prima facie, that the current legislation fails to properly balance the inherent tension 
at the heart of the intelligence process, between the need to protect the state’s security and the 
desire that all aspects of the state should, as far as possible, be transparent. The context in 
which the existing intelligence legislation was drafted means that the statutes provide a 
                                                          
69
 Wadham (n 47) 916. 
70
 The ISC is considered fully in ‘Chapter 4: The Role of the Intelligence and Security Committee’ 63-89. 
71
 s10(2) ISA 1994. 
72
 s10(5) ISA 1994. 
73
 s3(1), Schedule 3 ISA 1994. 
74
 s3(1)(b), Schedule 3 ISA 1994; for a definition of ‘sensitive information’ see s4, Schedule 3 ISA 1994. 
75
 Wadham (n 47) 926. 
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minimalist oversight framework which arguably does not have sufficient powers of effective 
scrutiny.
76
 Given the operational challenges which arise from the modern global intelligence 
landscape, the legislative framework is not compatible with intelligence oversight theory, 
which sees the division of functions between the branches of state as a means by which to 
ensure effective oversight. In contrast, the existing framework is noticeably deferential to the 
executive
77
 and not sufficiently prescriptive. The ISC’s Annual Report for 2010-2011 
recognised that the current legislation is ‘outdated’, and should be replaced with narrower 
legislation which more strictly regulates the agencies’ actions, as well as providing the 
Committee itself with greater powers.
78
 A fuller, and more specific, analysis of the current 
UK intelligence oversight framework will be provided in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
1.2 The Law Relating to Torture and Extraordinary Rendition 
 
In order to provide some context as to how the practice of extraordinary rendition has 
highlighted deficiencies in the current system of intelligence oversight in the UK, this section 
will consider the legal obligations, both domestic and international, which affect the UK's 
response to the allegations of agency complicity in the practice.  
 
Extraordinary rendition consists of both the extrajudicial capture of an individual, and their 
                                                          
76
 Leigh in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 94-5. 
77
 Ibid. 
78
 ISC, ‘Annual Report 2010-2011’ (Report) (July 2011) Cm 8114, 81-2. 
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removal to a third country where they may be tortured during interrogation.
79
 Until very 
recently, the allegations relating to the actions of UK agencies in no way suggested that 
agency personnel were directly involved in torture and extraordinary rendition. However, it 
has recently been alleged that the UK agencies led the extraordinary rendition of an 
individual from Hong Kong to Libya.
80
 Given that little is known about this incident to date, 
and the time constraints of this thesis, it is not possible to consider it fully, or to explore in 
sufficient detail the impact of these revelations upon the UK agencies’ policies. This thesis 
will instead focus upon the general allegations made thus far of the agencies’ complicity in 
extraordinary rendition; that is, the extent to which the agencies, knowingly or otherwise, 
facilitated and assisted the CIA's renditions programme.
81
 The term 'complicity' covers a 
broad range of acts
82
, from actual knowledge of the CIA's mispractice, to the interrogation of 
said detainees
83
, the provision of information to the US subsequently used to render 
individuals
84
, the feeding of questions to the US to ask detainees
85
, or the use of UK territory 
                                                          
79
 Sands, ‘Extraordinary Rendition: Complicity and its consequences’ (n 4) paras. 2-3. 
80
 R Yapp, ‘British-led rendition of Libyan and family to Gaddafi prison’, The Telegraph 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8754114/British-led-rendition-of-
Libyan-and-family-to-Gaddafi-prison.html> last accessed 25/09/2011; I Cobain & M Chulov, ‘Libyan papers 
show UK worked with Gaddafi in rendition operation’, The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/ 
sep/04/libyan-papers-show-uk-rendition> last accessed 25/09/2011. 
81
 Sands, ‘Extraordinary Rendition: Complicity and its consequences’ (n 4) para. 18. 
82
 Ibid, para. 7. 
83
 Binyam Mohamed alleged that he was interviewed by an MI5 official when held in Pakistan by the US; 
Reprieve, ‘Human Cargo: Binyam Mohamed and the Rendition Frequent Flyer Programme’ (Report) 10 June 
2008 <http://www.reprieve.org.uk/publications/humancargo/ > last accessed 17/06/2011, 7; ISC, ‘Rendition’ (n 
21) 33. 
84
 In the extraordinary rendition of Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el Banna, information passed from the UK to the 
US subsequently led to their capture; ISC, ‘Rendition’ (n 21) 37-46. 
85
 In the rendition of Binyam Mohamed, Mohamed was interrogated using questions based on specific 
information and facts which he alleges could only have come from UK sources; ‘Binyam Mohamed Statement 
in Full’, The Guardian <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/23/binyam-mohamed-statement-
guantanamo> last accessed 21/06/2011. 
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for the refuelling of rendition flights.
86
 
 
A number of existing domestic and international legal instruments are relevant to various 
aspects of these scenarios. For example, the first of the two elements of extraordinary 
rendition, that is, the extrajudicial transfer of an individual, constitutes an, ‘arbitrary arrest, 
detention or exile’ under the terms of Article 9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).
87
 It also breaches Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), and the right to liberty and security within Article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which is incorporated into UK law via the Human 
Rights Act 1998. Furthermore, a number of procedural offences can result from the very 
nature of the secrecy of the detention in which individuals are kept. Detainees have no right 
to hear the charges made against them, as per Article 9(2) ICCPR. Furthermore, they cannot 
challenge the legality of their detention by right, as is enshrined within Article 9(4) ICCPR, 
and have no right to a prompt trial, as per Article 9(3) ICCPR. As may also be presumed by 
the means by which such individuals are transferred to certain sites, and interrogated in 
relation to terrorism, they also do not benefit from the principle of presumptive innocence, 
thus contravening Article 11 UDHR. In relation to the means by which detainees are 
transported over state boundaries, the Convention on International Civil Aviation (“Chicago 
Convention”) provides for State sovereignty concerning the air space over their territory.88 It 
also holds that civil aircraft used for State purposes must have express permission in order to 
                                                          
86
 The UK territory of Diego Garcia was used as a refuelling stop for certain rendition flights; see HC Deb 21 
February 2008, vol 472, cols 547-560 (David Miliband). 
87
 Art 9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. 
88
 Art 1, International Convention on Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) 1944. For a discussion of the 
Convention’s application to extraordinary rendition, see European Commission for Democracy (Venice 
Commission), ‘Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect 
of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners’ (Opinion No. 363/2005, CDL-AD (2006) 
009, 17-18 March 2006, paras. 86-104. 
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fly over another’s territory.89 This would therefore appear to apply to aircraft used by private 
air companies to transport detainees for the purposes of rendition.
90
 
 
In relation to the second aspect of extraordinary rendition, an absolute prohibition on the use 
of torture is widely accepted to be of jus cogens status, as enunciated by Lord Hope in ex 
parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3).
91
 It has also been enshrined in numerous international legal 
instruments, most notably Article 2 of the Convention Against Torture 1984, which codifies 
the law in this area. The prohibition against the use of torture is also contained within Article 
3 ECHR, Article 7 ICCPR, Articles 13, 4, 17 of the Third Geneva Convention (Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War) and Articles 31, 32 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War).
 92
  The Convention Against 
Torture also outlaws complicity in torture. Given that constructive knowledge of the use of 
torture can create liability, actual ignorance of torture having taken place is not a defence.
93
 
Article 12 CAT holds that states have a positive obligation to investigate allegations of 
torture. Although there have been various criminal investigations relating to the rendition 
allegations, they have focused upon the UK’s involvement in the practice, rather than the 
actions of other states. Sands argues that the obligation to investigate under Article 12 
includes investigation of other states’ policies involving torture which may have implicated 
                                                          
89
 Ibid, paras. 93-95. 
90
 Ibid, paras. 102-3, 145-153. 
91
 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3) [2000] 1 AC 147, 152 
(per Lord Hope). 
92
 Art 2, Convention Against Torture 1984; see also, Art 7, ICCPR; Art 3, ECHR; Arts 13, 4, 17, Third Geneva 
Convention (Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War); Arts 31, 32, Fourth Geneva Convention (Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War). 
93
 i.e. that the state should have known that torture was taking place; see discussion in Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, ‘Allegations of UK Complicity in Torture (23rd report, session 2008-09) HL Paper 152, HC 230 
4 August 2009,  para. 32. 
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the UK in some form.
94
 If true, then it is arguable that the UK’s investigations may not have 
fulfilled the requirements of Article 12 CAT.   
 
Given that extraordinary rendition therefore may potentially lead to breaches of many 
international legal obligations, it is important to consider in what circumstances the UK may 
be liable for any such, ‘internationally wrongful acts’,95 under the rules of state responsibility.  
States are responsible for breaches of international obligations which can be attributed to it
96
, 
its organs and officials.
97
 Therefore, any potential misconduct of UK intelligence personnel, 
if causing a breach of international law, would create liability under the Draft Articles.
98
 The 
UK might also face responsibility under Article 16 of the Draft Articles, if established that the 
Intelligence and Security Agencies knowingly assisted in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act by another state. If, as is argued, ‘the key issue is whether that 
aid or assistance specifically facilitated the internationally wrongful act’,99 then the broad 
range of acts constituting complicity in extraordinary rendition, outlined above, may be 
covered by Art 16.
100
 Similarly, the alleged actions of UK personnel in cooperating and 
                                                          
94
 Sands, ‘Extraordinary Rendition: Complicity and its consequences’ (n 4) para. 35. 
95
 International Law Commission (ILC), Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (adopted by the ILC on 8 August 2001). 
96
 Art. 2, ILC Draft Articles. 
97
 Art. 4, ILC Draft Articles. 
98
 See also Art.6, Draft Articles, for potential liability in respect of the conduct of another state’s organ, if that 
organ is acting under the direct control of another state. Such control arguably might be established in respect of 
the US’s control of foreign agents, and therefore might also be a potential ground of secondary liability for the 
UK, if the agencies are found to have exercised direct control over foreign agents’ actions in the practice of 
extraordinary rendition. See APPGER and New York University Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice, 
‘Briefing Paper: Torture by proxy: International Law applicable to ‘Extraordinary Renditions’’ (12/10/05) 
APPG-01-05, 99. 
99
 Scheinin, M, and Vermeulen, M, ‘International law: human rights law and state responsibility’ in Born, H, 
Leigh I & Wills, A, International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability (1
st
 edn., Routledge 2011), 261. 
100
 Ibid 261-2. 
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assisting other states in rendition operations may create liability under the Draft Articles.
101
 
Importantly, if state responsibility was established under these rules, the UK would be 
required to remedy its breaches, potentially in the form of compensation to those affected, or 
an apology.
102
 Both such remedies would constitute a significant change in attitude from the 
UK government towards those allegedly subjected to extraordinary rendition. The rules of 
state responsibility therefore may provide a route by which to identify and remedy any 
breaches of international law in a way which is meaningful to both the citizens of the state 
and the individuals directly affected by the practice of extraordinary rendition. 
 
The effect of such comprehensive international legal obligations is also felt within the UK 
legal system; s134 Criminal Justice Act 1988 makes the use of torture a crime in domestic 
law, as required by Article 4 CAT, whilst the HRA 1998 incorporates the provisions of the 
ECHR into domestic law. In the case of A and Others (No 2) the House of Lords also held 
that material which has been obtained through torture is inadmissible as evidence before the 
courts.
103
 Although this aspect of the House of Lords’ decision was welcome, it must be 
noted that the standard of proof used to consider whether evidence should be admitted was 
held to be whether, on the balance of probabilities, torture was used; ‘[i]n other words, if 
SIAC is left in doubt as to whether the evidence was obtained in this way, it should admit 
it.’104 This leaves the applicant with a heavy burden to overcome in order to demonstrate the 
use of torture in obtaining the evidence before the court, which is unfortunate given that an 
individual generally has far fewer resources than the state to prove such allegations, and 
might face great difficulties in obtaining the sufficient evidence to do so. 
                                                          
101
 Arts. 40 and 41, Draft Articles; ibid 262-265. 
102
 Arts. 34-37, Draft Articles; ibid 266-269.  
103
 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2005] UKHL 71. 
104
 Ibid, para. 119 (per Lord Hope). 
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As discussed, many domestic and international legal obligations apply to all variations of 
complicity in extraordinary rendition, in relation to the means by which an individual is 
transported to a third state outside of due process, and the subsequent use of torture. This may 
be litigated in both the domestic and international arena, given the potential for liability to 
arise under the rules of state responsibility. However, to date, there have been relatively few 
cases brought directly against a state for their alleged complicity in the use of torture, or the 
practice of extraordinary rendition. In the UK, attempts at litigation have largely resulted in 
discussions surrounding the use of secret evidence and the closed material procedure, rather 
than the substance of the allegations.
105
 Until cases move towards discussions of the 
substantive content of allegations of complicity, it will therefore be somewhat difficult to 
predict how the UK courts might interpret the relevant laws and obligations in this area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105
 See discussions in ‘Extraordinary Rendition in the UK Courts’, 98-109. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE CHALLENGES OF WORKING WITHIN A GLOBAL 
INTELLIGENCE LANDSCAPE  
 
2.1 Introduction: The Global Intelligence Landscape 
 
The role of the UK intelligence agencies has become much more publicly visible in recent 
years, reflecting, ‘the new significance accorded to intelligence’106 within the UK’s domestic 
and foreign policies since the events of 9/11. Although the resulting globalisation and 
expansion of intelligence have somewhat led to greater public knowledge about the 
intelligence process, there is still largely a ‘veil of secrecy’107 under which intelligence 
activities take place, and which prevents the agencies from adopting the level of openness 
which is sought from actors outside the intelligence circle. This has created a difficult 
environment in which the UK agencies must operate, given that the current oversight 
structure which exists in relation to the UK agencies is arguably not sufficiently prescriptive 
to do so in a globalised intelligence landscape.
108
 The agencies’ ability to stay within the 
boundaries of acceptable practice has been challenged through lack of specific guidance and 
therefore, in order to effectively analyse the current UK intelligence oversight framework, it 
is firstly necessary to consider the operational landscape in which the UK intelligence and 
                                                          
106
 Eminent Jurists’ Panel (n 10) 68; ‘Preface’ in Born & Caparini (n 7); Caparini in Born & Caparini (n 7) 23; 
Leigh in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 85; Born, H, & Johnson, L, ‘Balancing Operational Efficiency and 
Democratic Legitimacy’ in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 225; Field, A, ‘Tracking terrorist networks: problems 
of intelligence sharing within the UK intelligence community’ (2009) Rev. Int’l Studies 35(4) 997-1009, 997; 
Herman, M, ‘11 September: Legitimizing Intelligence?’ (2002) 16(2) Int’l Rel 227, 228. 
107
 Caparini in Born & Caparini (n 7) 3. 
108
 For an outline of the argument that s1 SSA 1989 and s1 ISA 1994 are not sufficiently detailed to provide 
acceptable oversight, see above, ‘The Legislative Oversight Framework of the UK Intelligence and Security 
Services’, 13-21.  
29 
Word Count: 40,214 inclusive of abstract and footnotes, excluding bibliography 
security agencies operate, in order to understand the challenges they face, and how these may 
lead to accountability gaps.
109
  
 
Three main factors have contributed to changing state of the global intelligence landscape: 
firstly, horizontal and international ‘superterrorism’110 has emerged as the predominant threat 
to global security, thus changing the nature of the agencies’ response to security threats. 
Secondly, globalisation has broken down boundaries between states, thereby facilitating the 
free exchange of intelligence information between states, and enabling foreign partner 
agencies to share information about their practices. Consequently, this means that, ‘national 
security is becoming ever more dependent on regional and global stability and the solidarity 
of like-minded nations.’111 Finally, the technological revolution, leading to an expansion of 
intelligence collection and creation of an open intelligence landscape, creates difficulties for 
the agencies in terms of their ability to extract meaningful data from vast quantities of 
accessible information.  
 
An open intelligence landscape means that the UK agencies may successfully pursue their 
operations against terrorist threats; with fewer barriers between foreign liaison partners, 
partner agencies may easily cooperate and create meaningful intelligence relationships.
112
 
Such relationships may be pursued through transnational associations such as the Berne 
                                                          
109
 This is an essential ‘prerequisite for effective control, accountability, and oversight’, see Schreier in Born & 
Caparini (n 7) 44. 
110
 Leigh in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 5. 
111
 Schreier in Born & Caparini (n 7) 28. 
112
 Caparini in Born & Caparini (n 7) 23. 
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Group
113
, or on a more informal and opportunistic basis. However, given that 
“superterrorism” is horizontal and decentralised, all such intelligence relationships and 
networks must assist state intelligence agencies to quickly and effectively mobilise in 
response to a rapidly changing threat.
114
 Due to the source of most terrorist threats within the 
Middle East, intelligence relationships with local agencies are particularly valuable to 
Western states, given that local agents speak the language, understand the culture, and know 
the terrain.
115
 Although not displacing the power of the most influential countries within the 
intelligence community, such developments have allowed previously weak foreign agencies 
to wield some influence over the operational aspects of the “War on Terror”. 
 
Given that the UK intelligence and security agencies previously operated in a closed 
intelligence environment, generally cooperating in bilateral relationships with a select 
number of states of largely equal power and influence, they are now, ‘far too slow…to 
restructure, reorient, and adapt their activities to the new risks, dangers, threats and 
opportunities in the current security environment.’116 As such, the agencies must overcome a 
number of challenges before they may operate comfortably within the modern intelligence 
landscape. The biggest of these challenges lies with the need for increased international 
intelligence cooperation, since there is an ever-present danger that cooperation between 
various agencies, which adhere to different operational and human rights standards, can result 
                                                          
113
 See, for example, the attempt to create European intelligence networks; Gill, P, & Phythian, M, Intelligence 
in an Insecure World (3
rd
 edn., Polity Press, Cambridge 2009), 60. 
114
 Schreier in Born & Caparini (n 7) 29. 
115
 Hitz, F, ‘Human Source Intelligence’ in Johnson, L, (ed.), Handbook of Intelligence Studies (Routledge, 
Oxon. 2009), 128. 
116
 Schreier in Born & Caparini (n7) 26; Gibson, ‘In the Eye of the Perfect Storm: Re-Imagining, Reforming and 
Refocusing Intelligence for Risk, Globalisation and Changing Societal Expectation’ (n 14) 23, 37. 
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in complicity in practices such as extraordinary rendition.
117
 Although the usefulness of 
intelligence liaisons outweighs such threats, Gill argues that the agencies need to nevertheless 
focus upon achieving internal cultural change
118
, in order to protect against potentially 
negative outside influences. 
 
Despite increased international intelligence cooperation, ‘globalization and the information 
revolution cause problems anywhere to metasize much faster than before.’119 Since terrorist 
plots are horizontal and decentralised, they may transcend boundaries, making it difficult for 
intelligence agencies to trace their activities across borders despite mobilized resources and 
technologies.
120
 Furthermore, given the effect of globalisation in breaking down state 
barriers, there are increasing numbers of actors within the intelligence sector: public, private 
and rogue, who operate on a level playing field, and therefore make intelligence predictions 
difficult to make.
121
 The increasing use of technologically driven responses to terrorism 
allows the agencies to increase their collection capacity and interpret intelligence in new 
ways. However, ironically, over-reliance on new technologies leads to the collection of vast 
quantities of fragmented information, meaning that traditional methods of collecting 
intelligence are marginalised in favour of methods which make it difficult to integrate 
                                                          
117
 Eminent Jurists’ Panel (n 10) 68, 79-80. This is also a relevant concern with regards to waterboarding. BBC, 
‘Brains, not brutality’ (Today Programme, Radio 4) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_ 
9170000/9170110.stm> last accessed 15 June 2011, at 2.03 and 05.11 onwards (Dr Kim Howells). 
118
 Gill in Born & Caparini (n 7) 196. 
119
 Andregg, M, ‘Intelligence Ethics: Laying a Foundation for the Second Oldest Profession’ in Johnson (n 115) 
62. 
120
 Gibson, ‘In the Eye of the Perfect Storm: Re-Imagining, Reforming and Refocusing Intelligence for Risk, 
Globalisation and Changing Societal Expectation’ (n 14) 37. 
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 Schreier in Born & Caparini (n 7) 29. 
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information and promote cohesive operational practices.
122
 As a consequence, agencies must 
constantly prioritise which leads to follow, and may easily miss vital fragments of actionable 
intelligence. The use of human intelligence (HUMINT), as a traditional collection method, 
may be a useful means of obtaining accurate and personalised intelligence. However, in 
recent years it has developed against a background of operational frustrations and as a means 
by which to make sense of fragmented intelligence about terrorist activity. As such, the 
reliability of HUMINT may be undermined by inconsistent operational practices caused by 
insufficient training and guidance, as in the treatment of detainees under UK custody by the 
UK agencies.
123
  
 
Cumulatively, these challenges create an intelligence landscape which is difficult to navigate 
successfully, especially given the lack of detailed legislative regulation of the agencies. Of 
overriding importance is the need to ensure that the UK agencies’ responses to 
“superterrorism” are accompanied by relevant adjustments in the oversight structure.124 
Given the numerous intelligence developments which have taken place in recent years, one 
must question whether an oversight system designed in the 1980s and 1990s is out of date for 
the modern world, and the environment in which agencies now operate.
125
 This chapter will 
continue with an examination of some of the afore-mentioned challenges faced by the UK 
intelligence and security agencies, starting with a consideration of the practice of intelligence 
cooperation, and also focusing upon the internal challenges facing agencies, and the ethical 
standards to which they must work in this new global intelligence landscape. 
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2.2 International Intelligence Cooperation126 
 
For the intelligence community, an important consequence of the events of 9/11 has been 
increasing cooperation between UK agents and, ‘their opposite numbers in partner-
countries’127, as a means by which to mobilise against the terrorist threat128. A certain level of 
cooperation has always occurred between intelligence agencies, given that, ‘no one state is so 
omniscient that it has access to all the intelligence information relevant to its national security 
interest.’129 However, the modern day threat of decentralised “superterrorism”, means that 
MI5 and MI6 are now necessarily dealing, on a day-to-day basis, with ‘non-traditional 
partners from developing world countries.’130 Therefore, the need for valuable intelligence is 
increasingly seen to outweigh the challenges of dealing with new, and possibly hostile, 
foreign counterparts.
131
 This is not necessarily a problem per se, but if UK agencies mean to 
maintain good practice, they must be vigilant to remain independent from other states’ 
political interests and goals, and not be influenced by the practices of foreign agencies.
132
 As 
the allegations of UK complicity in the CIA-led rendition programme demonstrates, these 
challenges are very real. Greater cooperation between state agencies creates problems for the 
oversight of intelligence agencies, since there is little guidance as to how intelligence 
procured from foreign agencies should be provided for within the legislative oversight 
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framework.
133
 This section will therefore explore the challenges of increased international 
intelligence cooperation, and how they have manifested in examples of alleged extraordinary 
rendition.  
 
An initial challenge for intelligence services who share material with their foreign 
counterparts illustrates the flip-side of the technological revolution; the fact that where 
actionable intelligence is successfully shared across state boundaries, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to secure that material from outside interference.
134
 The ease with which intelligence 
may be shared facilitates the ability of rogue parties to gain access to sensitive material, and 
increases the possibility of agencies unwittingly, ‘sharing information with discreditable 
regimes.’135 The risk of having the resulting material intercepted by outside parties may act as 
a disincentive for states to share sensitive and valuable information with their foreign 
counterparts, especially given the time and resources employed in sifting through, and 
interpreting, vast quantities of fragmented information in order to produce actionable 
intelligence.
 136
  
 
The terms of an intelligence relationship are largely determined by the states involved; in 
particular, the influence of certain Western states has generally dictated the priorities and 
content of the information flow within their relationship with local, less powerful, 
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agencies.
137
 The CIA’s ‘outsourcing of torture’138 to states with questionable adherence to 
international human rights obligations reflects the United States’ place within the hierarchy of 
the global intelligence community. Conversely, Western agencies can also be influenced by 
those of less powerful states, given that they are increasingly reliant upon the knowledge and 
interpretation skills of local intelligence agents. Given these inequalities, agencies might be 
more likely to turn a blind eye to, or not inquire about, their local counterparts’ use of 
intelligence sourcing techniques such as torture
139
 if protestations might jeopardise their 
partnership with that agency. However, Pfaff argues that successful intelligence relationships 
are premised on a number of ‘reasonable shared expectations’140 of what the states involved 
will and will not do in the course of their operations. As signatories of international legal 
instruments banning torture, such as the Convention Against Torture 1984 (CAT), states 
therefore implicitly create expectations that they will adhere their international legal 
obligations, through their adoption of the statute.
141
 Therefore states which use, condone, or 
are complicit in torture undermine the very basis on which they seek to construct meaningful 
intelligence relationships.  
 
Given the need to maintain operational secrecy in the realm of intelligence, international 
intelligence cooperation between foreign agencies is often characterised by a, ‘high premium 
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placed on source protection and general reluctance to pool ‘sensitive’ information.’142 Mutual 
distrust may prevent the exchange of valuable intelligence between counterpart agencies, and 
thereby undermine intelligence relationships. In order to discourage this, states sharing 
intelligence with their foreign counterparts generally do so according to the “control 
principle”; that is, the doctrine ‘which shields information supplied to an agency by 
intelligence partners in other countries from attribution.’143 In other words, shared 
information may only be used according to the sending state’s instructions, thus also making, 
‘secretive government…a collateral consequence of intelligence sharing.’144  
 
The effect of the control principle is clear in relation to the allegations of complicity; 
evidence provided by foreign agencies relating to certain individuals’ alleged rendition may 
not be published, or appear as evidence before the courts. It can be argued that an alternative 
effect of the control principle is that any intelligence which might dispel allegations of 
impropriety made against the agencies is also withheld from publication. It has therefore been 
argued that blanket provisions, or caveats, relating to the future use of shared intelligence, 
‘ris[k] giving secrecy law an extended reach.’145 In Mohamed (No. 2), the Court of Appeal 
considered the application of the control principle in detail, holding it to be of considerable 
importance in determining the effect of the disclosure of intelligence material.
146
 Although 
the Court did order publication of certain paragraphs relating to the torture of Binyam 
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Mohamed, its decision was, ‘dependent on highly unusual facts’147; there had been prior 
publication of the information in question in the United States, meaning that the US-UK 
intelligence relationship would not be harmed by disclosure.
148
  
 
It is arguable that the control principle provides a means by which states sharing intelligence 
may resist attempts at accountability. In terms of the UK oversight system, for example, there 
is no precedent to show how information shared between foreign intelligence agencies might 
be scrutinised by domestic bodies.
149
 Although the Intelligence and Security Committee is the 
parliamentary committee which oversees the agencies’ actions, it is charged only with 
overseeing the actions of the UK agencies, not those of foreign states.
150
 Indeed, the 
Committee has explicitly stated, in reports relating to the treatment of detainees and the 
practice of rendition, that it would not consider the legality, or otherwise, of US agencies’ 
practices.
151
 However, given that UK and US intelligence operations have been very closely 
linked in their response to modern day terrorist threats
152, arguably the two states’ policies 
cannot be clearly delineated into the remits of separate inquiries without the possibility that 
key information might be lost, or left unconsidered. Indeed, it has been argued that domestic 
parliamentary oversight bodies appear best placed to scrutinise international intelligence 
cooperation, so long as they have sufficient powers of investigation, and a wide enough 
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remit, to do so.
153
 In order to allow for scrutiny of intelligence liaisons within the UK 
oversight framework, the legislation establishing the ISC’s powers and remit must therefore 
be brought up to date, as is advocated elsewhere in this thesis.
154
 
 
Standards must be set against which intelligence obtained by torture methods, and then sent 
to the UK agencies, may be scrutinised. This is especially true given that the UK agencies’ 
use of such intelligence may undermine the UK’s human rights obligations if they have 
knowledge of the means by which the material was obtained; acceptance and use of such 
intelligence may constitute ‘complicity’ within the terms of Article 4 CAT 1984. Given the 
dominance of the control principle, and need to protect sources and operational detail, it is 
inevitable that the UK agencies may sometimes be passed useful and actionable intelligence 
for which they do not know the source. It is submitted that such intelligence may be acted 
upon if all reasonable inquiries are made to find out the means by which it was obtained. If 
such inquiries are unanswered, leave doubt, or point to the use of torture, then it must be 
assessed whether, on the balance of probabilities, torture is deemed to have been used. The 
burden in A and Others (No 2) would be reversed and placed upon the government to prove 
that torture has not been used. Such an approach would be time consuming, requiring relevant 
information to be sought before intelligence could be acted upon. Furthermore, although 
intelligence is not sought in an evidential capacity, this approach would subject it to similar 
tests as have been advocated by the courts. However, by employing such a stringent 
approach, the UK agencies would be able to ensure that, as far as possible, they act upon 
reliable and “safe” information. In turn, this would reduce the chances of the agencies being 
                                                          
153
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implicated in future allegations of complicity by entrenching domestic and international legal 
obligations at the heart of foreign liaison agreements.  
 
The practice of extraordinary rendition demonstrates the ease with which the international 
community may potentially, ‘side-step the need for accountability and conformity with 
human rights norms.’155 Although states recognise the importance of intelligence oversight 
within their own domestic legal systems, an international oversight framework does not exist 
in a distinct form.
156
 To an extent, this is easy to comprehend; the practices of diverse foreign 
agencies acting in pursuance of domestic priorities cannot be expected to easily fit one single 
model of global oversight. Furthermore, the existing network of international legal 
obligations, as typified by the CAT 1984, ECHR, ICCPR and Geneva Conventions, could be 
said to constitute international standards to which intelligence should necessarily conform. 
However, an international intelligence oversight framework is necessary and achievable, 
given the increase in international intelligence cooperation, and circumstances in which 
agencies might find themselves compromised, and for which they require specific guidance. 
To a certain extent, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights could be said to 
demonstrate, ‘a slowly expanding body of pan-European legal norms for oversight beyond 
the nation state itself.’157 However, the impact of the ECtHR is limited, given that its effect is, 
firstly, European and, secondly, a responsive form of oversight. Global intelligence oversight 
must be constructed differently to domestic intelligence oversight since it is unrealistic to 
expect global oversight to be exhaustive, or to focus on issues of efficiency, which are better 
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placed to be examined by domestic bodies. Rather, an international body would set minimum 
standards of propriety for intelligence agencies around the globe, upon which domestic 
bodies would add specific details according to the organisation, administration and policies of 
that State’s intelligence and security agencies.  
 
 
2.3 Internal Challenges 
 
Although intelligence agencies were designed to be only, ‘concerned with information (and 
forecasts)’158, the modern day terrorism threat necessitates that agencies must now be 
proactive in sourcing intelligence from a range of external sources, and through the use of 
new technologies. They must also cooperate closely with other internal agencies, in the form 
of fusion centres, and similar joint services.
159
 However, the move from traditional 
intelligence practices creates a danger that, without specific operational guidance, the 
individual roles of MI5 and MI6 could, to some extent, merge and become indistinguishable, 
or could overlap with the role of the police. In both instances, this would challenge effective 
oversight within the existing UK framework, and so this section thus explores the difficulties 
which face the UK agencies internally within the new global intelligence landscape. 
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Hitz notes that after the events of 9/11, ‘[a] division between domestic and international 
spheres of terrorism no longer existed’160; as such, the need for MI5 and MI6 to cooperate 
closely has made the distinction between the two less obvious.
161
 Evidently, without 
cooperation between domestic and external agencies, there cannot be a consistent and 
effective national response to the global terrorist threat. However, since MI5 and MI6 have, 
‘different institutional priorities and responsibilities’162, extensive cooperation might cause 
the agencies to adopt practices which are not best suited to the work that they individually 
perform. Given that MI6’s work concerns external threats to the state, it must necessarily 
cooperate with its foreign counterparts, and work within various different jurisdictions. This 
may make it difficult for the agency to interpret its legal obligations, and apply them in a 
changing operational context. Furthermore, collaboration with non-traditional intelligence 
partners may at times compromise the agency’s adherence to legal and human rights 
standards.
163
 Although the ISA 1994 seeks to place legal boundaries upon the work of MI6, 
agencies concerned with gathering external intelligence may necessarily be more difficult to 
regulate.
164
 A possible concern is that such a professional culture within external intelligence 
could, ‘infect the law-based norms of internal intelligence’165 and, in order to prevent this, 
cooperation between the UK agencies should be regulated internally through working 
guidelines; it is submitted that narrower legislative definitions of the separate agencies’ roles 
and duties would facilitate a conscious separation between the two.  
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The blurring of boundaries between the roles of the UK intelligence and security agencies 
also appears through the details of the allegations of complicity in extraordinary rendition. 
For example, Binyam Mohamed alleges that he was interviewed by a member of the security 
service (MI5) during his detention in Pakistan.
166
 Given that MI5 is primarily a domestic 
agency charged with protecting national security from within, whereas MI6 acts on overseas 
threats, any interviewing of detainees held abroad would logically be performed by MI6 
personnel. This example demonstrates the potential for confusion that enhanced cooperation 
may have in relation to extraordinary rendition, given that the overlapping of the agencies’ 
roles makes it difficult to piece together an accurate account of events. Although the ISC 
oversees the actions of both MI5 and MI6, a blurring of agency roles and lack of institutional 
separation may make the role of the ISC, and other oversight institutions, more difficult to 
perform.
167
 Therefore, although the recording of inter-agency collaboration no doubt already 
exists at an internal level, the ISC must be made aware of the details of such cooperation, 
within the limits of the “needs to know” doctrine, in order to allow it to delineate the actions 
of the two agencies, and thus ensure their propriety. 
 
There has also been extensive cooperation between the UK agencies and the police in recent 
years, with the intelligence agencies increasingly using traditional policing techniques such as 
detention and interrogation.
168
 Any broadening of the intelligence agencies’ role must be 
accompanied with parallel safeguards to ensure that agencies do not compromise their legal 
obligations or create a system of, ‘political policing.’169 This is because MI5 and MI6 
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primarily exist to source and gather intelligence, and therefore do not operate with the 
overriding long term view of furthering criminal investigations.
170
 In relation to the practice 
of extraordinary rendition, for example, torture evidence is not admissible within UK 
courts
171
, and so the results of the agencies’ actions are actionable only in an operational 
context. Furthermore, given that the use of policing techniques by the UK intelligence 
agencies currently has no specific legal basis, the publication of guidance relating to the 
correct procedure in relation to the use of interrogation is welcome in providing specific and 
detailed operational advice in this area.
172
 
 
 
2.4 Ethical Standards 
 
Although it is obvious that the UK intelligence and security agencies must operate in 
accordance with specific ethical and legal standards, in practice, intelligence operations give 
rise to, ‘many grey areas of moral thought, and generat[e] perplexing dilemmas where agents 
must balance the national interest in security…against some other virtue…’173 This is 
especially obvious in relation to alleged complicity in extraordinary rendition, and torture, 
since the definition of ‘complicity’ encompasses many situations and different degrees of 
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activity, or inactivity. In analysing how the UK intelligence agencies have sought to balance 
national security and the protection of democratic values, it is important to acknowledge the 
operational context in which they have worked, and especially the lack of a defined legal 
framework. This section will consider how the UK agencies’ ethical standards have been 
upheld against the backdrop of the “War on Terror”, how they are subjected to oversight, and 
whether this has been compromised by their alleged complicity in extraordinary rendition.  
 
In terms of the relationship between ethical standards and UK intelligence oversight, the ISC 
is not formally concerned with monitoring the agencies’ propriety, since according to s10(1) 
ISA 1994 it has no formal remit over operational concerns.
174
 In practice, however, the ISC 
has gone further than its legal remit
175
 by considering allegations of agency complicity in 
rendition in its 2007 report, which undoubtedly related to operational issues.
176
 In support of 
this development, some academics have suggested that parliamentary oversight is 
meaningless unless it incorporates some focus on the agencies’ propriety.177 By updating the 
text of s10, which currently holds that the ISC will consider the agencies’ ‘expenditure, 
administration and policy’, to include responsibility for overseeing the agencies’ propriety, 
the Committee’s role in monitoring ethical practice would be given a clear legal basis. The 
ISC would therefore be able to consider propriety comprehensively rather than in a piecemeal 
fashion, which is currently the case; ‘Rendition’, for example, contained no specific 
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references to human rights, although it evidently considered the agencies’ propriety through 
the very subject matter of the report. 
 
Specific guidelines and codes of practice also must be formulated internally in order to firmly 
entrench the agencies’ need to adhere to their domestic and international human rights 
obligations; due to the inherent secrecy of intelligence, it is difficult to know to what extent 
such a system already exists. In the interests of transparency, and from a presentational point 
of view, such guidance should preferably be made public or, if too sensitive, made available 
to the ISC, who could decide to redact its content if necessary. Although ultimately, ‘final 
resolutions of ethical dilemmas will not be found in statutes or even in declarations of human 
rights’178, precautions such as these will ensure that the agencies’ decision-making processes 
are influenced by an understanding of the UK’s legal human rights obligations, and how they 
may be engaged in an operational context.   
 
Although the oversight system within the UK is multi-layered and complex, ultimate 
responsibility for the ethical standards of intelligence agents must lie at an agency level. As 
Gill argues, ‘if oversight is only an external function then it becomes easier for agencies to 
see it as something troublesome that should be resisted.’179 A commitment to ensuring good 
practice necessitates that agency employees must, ‘be protected if they feel obliged to ‘blow 
the whistle’180 in order to ensure that concerns over certain events or practices may be 
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highlighted without fear of reprisal. In the past, whistle-blowing former agents have been 
viewed as damaging the agencies’ reputations, and their ability to conduct operations in 
secret.
181
 It is true that certain revelations may be counterproductive, in that they serve no 
public interest and cause more harm than good, especially if heavily publicised by media 
bodies.
182
 However, if leaks genuinely reveal malpractice, whistle-blowers assist in ensuring 
the effectiveness of the political and legal processes which seek to regulate and oversee the 
agencies.
183
 Therefore, in order to balance the need to prevent disclosure of sensitive 
information and the desire to identify and remedy wrongdoing, an independent and effective 
internal mechanism is required so that whistle-blowing agents do not resort to publication as 
first resort.
184
 
 
Although the UK agencies employ a staff counsellor to whom agency personnel may consult 
about their ethical concerns or grievances
185
, there is no formal institution which considers 
internal complaints against the agencies’ practices; the IPT considers claims brought by 
individuals alleging unlawful agency action, whilst the ISC has no separate function of 
addressing complaints. However, given that few details are known about the role, and the 
process by which complaints are resolved, it is impossible to conclude as to whether it is an 
effective internal mechanism, or merely a, ‘safety-valv[e] to reduce the risk of public 
disclosure.’186  
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2.5 Conclusion 
 
The context in which the UK intelligence and security services now operate is globalised and 
ever changing, especially given the increasing need for international intelligence cooperation 
in order to counter the global threat of “superterrorism”. It is submitted that the SSA 1989 
and ISA 1994 do not provide sufficiently narrow regulation of the agencies’ activities to 
allow them to operate successfully within this environment. In order for the UK agencies to 
cooperate with their foreign counterparts without compromising their legal commitments and 
policies, they must approach collaboration with a firm idea of their aims, and the means by 
which they will achieve these. Furthermore, although the control principle is vital to fostering 
trust between states, it must not be allowed to frustrate intelligence oversight, especially that 
which is undertaken by the ISC. Ensuring adherence to human rights norms, whilst 
maintaining effective intelligence cooperation, rests upon States somehow accommodating 
scrutiny of the control principle within the remit of national oversight bodies. These are better 
placed than international bodies to contextualise the principle with specific regard to the 
operational workings of national intelligence agencies.
187
   
 
The UK intelligence and security services must also be careful not to confuse their roles, 
between both each other, and also the police, since this may create internal confusion and 
operational delays. The agencies’ internal structures must accommodate the upholding of the 
agencies’ ethical and human rights commitments, in order to encourage consistent practice 
which is based upon clear legislation and international legal instruments. Personnel with 
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grievances related to misconduct must also be encouraged to report such, through an effective 
internal reporting mechanism, rather than facing the prospect of a prosecution under the 
Official Secrets Act as an initial step. Such changes to the current practices of the UK 
security and intelligence agencies would help to provoke meaningful change in the agencies’ 
operational practices, and to equip them to deal with the future challenges which lie in the 
area of intelligence. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will consider the government’s relationship with the UK intelligence and 
security agencies, in order to analyse their role within the overall intelligence oversight 
framework. Given that the executive is the branch of state most closely involved in the 
direction of the agencies’ operations, in many ways they have the most important oversight 
role in terms of their relationship with MI5 and MI6.
188
 Executive oversight is therefore the 
most informed branch of oversight, and perhaps also the “safest”, given that the overlap of 
intelligence with foreign and defence policy means that Ministers are constantly mindful of 
maintaining national security and restricting sensitive information. Alternatively, however, 
the executive’s protectiveness in regard to the UK intelligence agencies may raise concerns 
over the concealment of intelligence issues which are genuinely in the public interest, and the 
possibility of political influences affecting agency policies.  
 
Statutory provisions, in the form of ss1(1) and 2(1) SSA 1989, and ss1(1), 2(1), 5 and 7 ISA 
1994, formally regulate Ministers’ involvement with the agencies, but the secrecy and 
informality of the relationship between the two means that little is actually known about the 
extent and substance of their contact with each other. An extensive and fully accurate study 
of the executive aspect of intelligence oversight is therefore largely impossible. In terms of 
the allegations of UK complicity in extraordinary rendition, the lack of public information 
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surrounding the executive-agency relationship has made it difficult to separate the commands 
of agency heads with the involvement of government officials. This has been exacerbated by 
the secrecy of the agencies, and the denial, by government representatives, of all knowledge 
of complicity, in response to questions regarding the allegations of complicity.
189
 
 
The first part of this chapter looks at the role of the UK executive in theory, and in practice, 
by considering the statutory role of the executive in relation to the UK intelligence agencies, 
the principle of ministerial responsibility, the risk of politicization of intelligence, and the 
executive’s willingness to accept responsibility for any wrongdoing. This section will also 
advocate the need for the executive’s relationship with the agencies to be more clearly 
defined, and preferably limited to control, rather than oversight. The second part of the 
chapter will consider the executive’s role in controlling the publication, or restraint, of 
information about intelligence and UK agencies in the public domain.   
 
 
3.2 Executive Oversight: Theory and Practice 
 
Theoretically, the executive-agency relationship should not be so close that the executive 
politically influences the agencies, but should be close enough to prevent them from 
operating without checks.
190
 Translating this into practice, however, is difficult since the 
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existing legislative provisions allow for extensive executive control of the agencies without 
parallel parliamentary checks.
191
 It may be the case that information about the executive’s 
control of the agencies must be restrained as far as possible, especially if it relates to 
operational decision-making. However, if effective intelligence oversight relies upon the 
contribution of various actors, then this imbalance might frustrate the ISC’s oversight 
capacity, by creating areas of sensitive information to which the Committee has no access. 
This section will therefore analyse how the executive fulfils its statutory oversight functions 
in practice, and how well placed it is to do so within the intelligence oversight framework. 
 
Sections 1 of the SSA 1989 and ISA 1994 place responsibility for the intelligence and 
security services’ actions upon each agency’s relevant Secretary of State192; the Home 
Secretary retains responsibility of the Security Service (MI5), whereas the Secret Intelligence 
Service (MI6) is responsible to the Foreign Secretary. This reflects the operational focus and 
remit of the two agencies. The agencies are directed by the heads of the agencies on a day-to-
day basis, themselves appointed by the relevant Secretary of State, in accordance with ss2 
SSA 1989 and ISA 1994. More important operational decisions are generally taken by the 
relevant Minister
193
, who also holds powers of authorisation for warrants allowing officials to 
interfere with property
194
, to intercept material
195
 or to practise surveillance.
196
 Government 
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guidance as to the handling of detainees under UK custody has entrenched this by holding 
that intelligence personnel must inform the relevant Secretary of State before proceeding 
where they are unsure about the appropriate actions to take.
197
 However, more generally, both 
pieces of legislation which established the agencies’ roles and remits allude to the executive’s 
role within intelligence oversight very broadly, and do not provide specific detail about how 
the executive-agency relationship should operate in practice, in response to operational 
difficulties.
198
 Any attempt to provide more specific detail has occurred in a piecemeal 
fashion, as demonstrated by the guidance to intelligence personnel on the treatment of 
detainees. The resulting lack of principles regulating the executive-agency relationship 
therefore creates potential challenges for the ISC, the courts, or civil society in responding to 
alleged agency misconduct, and producing authoritative reports about the intelligence 
agencies’ actions. 
 
The powers held by Ministers, and especially the Prime Minister, concern both the control of 
the agencies, in terms of the direction of their activities, and also aspects of their oversight. 
Therefore, executive oversight, in relation to alleged complicity in torture, revolves around 
policies which the government itself has promulgated and sanctioned. The resulting proximity 
between the executive and intelligence agencies could potentially politicise the agencies, 
through shielding them from external criticism. The government guidelines about the 
treatment of detainees by UK agencies reinforce the doctrine of ministerial responsibility; 
Ministers are called upon to make decisions as to appropriate action where it is believed that 
                                                          
197
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there is a serious risk that torture, or mistreatment, may have been used to generate 
information.
199
 Under previous governments, the lack of specific guidelines as to the 
agencies’ procedures in situations involving detention and interrogation has made it difficult 
to determine whether Ministers were aware of the renditions cycle, or policy relating to the 
UK agencies’ alleged complicity in such.200 For this reason, it was suggested that a 
forthcoming inquiry by Sir Peter Gibson investigate the extent of previous ministerial 
accountability within its remit, as well as the means by which it is to be achieved in the 
future, and according to the new guidelines.
201
 In any case, through establishing a clear, and 
public, decision-making hierarchy, and establishing approved procedure for certain specific 
situations, the new guidance creates some certainty for agency personnel, although this is 
limited to the particular situations in which it applies.  
 
Ultimate responsibility for both agencies rests upon the Prime Minister, as the head of the 
executive. This manifests itself in several legislative provisions; ss2(4) SSA 1989 and ISA 
1994 hold that all reports by the agencies’ heads must be sent directly to the Prime 
                                                          
199
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had occurred, at 27; I Cobain, ‘Tony Blair knew of secret policy on terror interrogations’ The Guardian, 18 
March 2010 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/18/overseas-torture-government-refuses-publish> last 
accessed 13/02/2011. 
201
 Human Rights Watch, ‘United Kingdom: Letter to Sir Peter Gibson on the Inquiry into involvement with 
detainees in counter-terrorism operations’ 2 December 2010 <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/12/03/united-
kingdom-letter-sir-peter-gibson-inquiry-involvement-detainees-counter-terrori> last accessed 13/02/2011. The 
Gibson inquiry no longer has an official mandate regarding the allegations of complicity, but will report to the 
government on its findings before it was wound down. 
54 
Word Count: 40,214 inclusive of abstract and footnotes, excluding bibliography 
Minister
202
, and s10(5) ISA 1994 provides that the reports of the Intelligence and Security 
Committee must also be sent to the Prime Minister prior to their publication. The reports of 
the Intelligence Services Commissioner
203
 and Interception of Communications 
Commissioner
204
 are also sent firstly to the Prime Minister. The membership of the ISC is 
appointed by the Prime Minister, according to s10(3) ISA 1994
205
, and he may also decide to 
withhold sections of the Committee’s reports before laying them before Parliament.206 
Agency heads also have a direct right of access to the Prime Minister.
207
 Indeed, it has been 
argued that in practice, despite the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, the head of the 
executive is largely responsible for running the intelligence services.
208
 However, with only 
broad legislative provisions regulating the chain of command between the executive and the 
intelligence agencies, it is difficult to know whether this is true.
209
  
 
The extent to which Ministers uphold their legislative roles of oversight depends upon their 
willingness to proactively exercise their responsibilities and seek advice before making 
important decisions.
210
 Gill suggests that the doctrine of “plausibility deniability” has 
previously been adopted by Ministers in order to let the agencies to operate largely 
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unchecked by the executive
211
, whilst allowing the executive to subsequently plead ignorance 
if evidence of malpractice is made public. The doctrine suggests that, in order to avoid public 
scrutiny, Ministers should seek the minimum information necessary for them to carry out 
their responsibilities. As such it may, ‘insulate top decision-makers and political authorities 
from the consequences’212 of their departments’ policies, and allow them to characterise 
failures as individual errors rather than systemic policy.
213
 This appears to have been the case 
in relation to the investigation of the actions of an individual MI5 officer in the case of 
Binyam Mohamed, rather than an investigation into the actions of the security hierarchy as a 
whole.
214
  
 
However, “plausible deniability” may otherwise be seen as a natural extension of the “need to 
know” doctrine; that is, the fact that sensitive information and intelligence is shared only 
between agency personnel who must have access to it. This significantly protects operational 
secrecy through minimising the possibility of valuable intelligence being leaked to external 
sources.
215
 Read as such, “plausible deniability” may be as much concerned with protecting 
intelligence operations and sources as with protecting Ministers from external criticism. 
However, if this is the case, given that the executive has legislative responsibilities with 
regards to MI5 and MI6, they must nevertheless be seen to exercise informed scrutiny over 
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the intelligence agencies. Within an overly broad legislative framework, the doctrines of 
“plausible deniability” and “need to know” may instead create the impression that the 
Minister is perceived, within the agencies themselves, as an “outsider” who is not possessed 
of the relevant skills to have access to valuable intelligence.
216
 Although it is generally the 
case that the Home and Foreign Secretaries generally have little or no, prior intelligence 
experience, their decision-making authority must be respected by the agencies. Ministers may 
only practically be called to account by Parliament, ‘for the actions of the intelligence 
agencies if [they] have real powers of control’217, and are well informed and briefed by 
agency officials.
218
  
 
As a result of the proximity between the areas of foreign security policy and intelligence, it is 
true that, to some extent, ‘the intelligence activities of states…are inescapably bound up with 
politics.’219 Whilst an effective working relationship between the executive and UK security 
and intelligence agencies is necessary, their relationship should not be so close as to allow for 
the possibility of ministerial abuse, or overt politicization, of the intelligence process.
220
 
Given the legislative provisions which allow Ministers to exert influence on the intelligence 
process, there may be a risk that Ministers concerned with policy within a specific 
department may employ agency resources for party political purposes
221
 and thus 
compromise the quality and focus of intelligence. The most obvious example of this is the 
intelligence dossier produced to support the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, 
                                                          
216
 Ibid. 
217
 Born & Leigh in SIPRI Yearbook 2007 (n 14) 199. 
218
 DCAF, ‘Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight – A Practitioner’s View’ (n 161), 7, 27-8,44; Gill in 
Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 14. 
219
 Gill in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 12; Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (n 10) 137. 
220
 Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State (n 12) 217-20, 223-4. 
221
 Born & Leigh in SIPRI Yearbook 2007 (n 14) 197. 
57 
Word Count: 40,214 inclusive of abstract and footnotes, excluding bibliography 
and the subsequent UK invasion.
222
 Although an extreme instance of intelligence 
politicization, one could also argue that the proximity between the UK and US agencies’ 
intelligence policies in the “War on Terror” was driven by the UK government’s desire to 
maintain a productive relationship with the US.
223
 If the allegations of the UK’s complicity in 
the CIA’s rendition programme are found to be true, therefore, the UK agencies’ actions 
could be viewed as a result of political influence within the intelligence process. A means by 
which to minimise the possibility of such politicisation is to ensure that the powers of the 
other branches of oversight, the ISC, judiciary and civil society, are sufficiently robust to 
check against the use of intelligence for, ‘narro[w] political or sectoral interests.’224 An 
internal system of feedback, and effective tasking between Ministers and the intelligence 
services, would also keep the intelligence process outside of party politics, and ensure 
constant monitoring of the possibility of politicisation.
225
  
 
Ensuring that a balanced relationship exists between the executive and the UK intelligence 
agencies does not guarantee effective oversight unless the executive willingly accepts 
responsibility for its decisions and actions, and welcomes increased scrutiny of 
intelligence.
226
 This has not traditionally been the case, with the Home Affairs Committee 
stating in 1999 that, ‘in the past resistance to greater openness came…from Whitehall and 
Government’.227  In relation to the allegations of complicity, although the UK government 
acknowledged that the British territory of Diego Garcia was used as a refuelling stop by CIA 
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rendition planes
228
, generally executive responses to the allegations have consisted of 
wholesale refusal that the agencies would engage in such practices without consideration of 
the issues involved.
229
 The recent out of court settlement made by the government to former 
detainees of Guantanamo Bay
230
 was explained as a money-saving exercise
231
 which avoided 
the expense of drawn out litigation, and the danger of allowing sensitive information to be 
published. However existing legal procedures allow for the use of sensitive information 
within the court room procedure
232
, and so one might question whether policy reasons were 
in fact overriding factors in their decision to settle. The publication of guidance as to the 
treatment of detainees by UK forces
233
 is therefore to be welcomed in overtly emphasising 
ministerial responsibility for making certain key decisions, and detailing a clear chain of 
command for the decision-making process.  
 
Section 7 ISA 1994 purports to limit the liability of the executive in respect of the actions of 
officials operating abroad, through holding that,  
‘(1) If, apart from this section, a person would be liable in the United Kingdom for 
any act done outside the British Islands, he shall not be so liable if the act is one 
                                                          
228
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which is authorised to be done by virtue of an authorisation given by the Secretary of 
State under this section.’  
 
The Secretary may authorise such actions, according to s7(3)(a) ISA 1994, if they are, 
‘necessary for the proper discharge of a function of the Intelligence Service’. However, given 
that Ministers are responsible in international law for the actions of intelligence agencies
234
, 
they would still incur legal liability for any wrongful actions in relation to the practice of 
extraordinary rendition. Therefore, Ministers must be proactive in ensuring responsible 
operational practice. A definitive account of the UK’s domestic and international legal 
obligations, published by an expert non-executive body, and endorsed by the government, 
would assist in ensuring that, regardless of any party political policies or interests
235
, the 
government recognises as binding certain legal provisions concerning torture and 
extraordinary rendition.  
 
The forthcoming review of allegations of complicity by Sir Peter Gibson was said to formally 
draw a line under alleged agency malpractice, and make recommendations for the future.
236
 
Its terms of reference, as set in July 2011, covered the UK Government and agencies’ 
knowledge of, and involvement in, rendition, including how growing awareness of such 
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practices changed agency policy.
237
 Although the inquiry is now defunct, given its remit over 
government policy, it would have been interesting to observe the extent of ministerial 
participation with the inquiry as a means of oversight. A number of former Ministers 
committed themselves to give evidence to the inquiry
238, and the fact that witnesses’ evidence 
would not be used against them in future criminal proceedings was thought to constitute a 
powerful incentive to persuade others to volunteer.
239
 Although the Prime Minister has not 
confirmed that the inquiry’s report will be published,240 it is submitted that this is necessary 
in order to ensure that transparency is seen to have been achieved, despite the fact that the 
inquiry itself has ceased its investigations.  
 
The difficulty in making sense of the relationship between the executive and the agencies 
rests upon the fact that the executive’s role, in relation to the agencies, is too broad. 
Oversight, a separate concept to that of control, is, ‘a means of ensuring public accountability 
for the decisions and actions of security and intelligence services.’241 The executive evidently 
has a relationship of control in relation to the UK intelligence agencies, due to their 
legislative operational decision-making capacity.
242
 It has also been argued that the executive 
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exercise a role of oversight over the UK intelligence agencies
243
, which should consist of a 
clear tasking system to identify and prevent intelligence failures.
244
 However, an essential 
feature of oversight is said to be the extent to which it is independent from the executive.
245
 
The fact that the executive has roles in both the control of the agencies, and their oversight, 
therefore creates confusion in terms of the overall UK oversight structure. Furthermore, its 
proximity to the agencies means that it is ill placed to oversee the agencies’ actions 
objectively as a ‘source of external control.’246 Therefore, the executive’s relationship with 
the intelligence agencies should be clearly limited to that of control, and references to the 
executive’s capacity of oversight should be removed.247 The principle of ministerial 
responsibility would remain intact, given the control aspect of the relationship. However, the 
proposed approach would only succeed if Parliament and the judiciary had more effective 
powers of oversight regarding their ability to deal with the subject matter in question.  
 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
The overriding theme running throughout the preceding discussion has been the difficulty of 
achieving a balanced relationship between the executive and the intelligence and security 
                                                          
243
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agencies. Too little control, and a “State within a State” mentality may reign248; too much, 
and the intelligence process may become tainted by party political policies. The former 
option creates difficulties for proper and effective oversight, whilst the latter compromises 
the impartiality of intelligence procured by the services. It is submitted that Ministers should 
be as proactive as practically possible without overstepping their legislative duties; given the 
broadness of ss 1(1) SSA and ISA 1994, and lack of detail as to the relevant Ministers’ 
duties, it is difficult to see how this would occur. The existing legislative provisions must 
therefore be more narrowly constructed, in order to make the executive-agency relationship 
as open as possible. The government’s guidance on the procedures relating to the detention 
and interrogation of detainees is instructive as to the chain of command in certain situations.  
 
Further to analysing the executive’s role in the control, and oversight, of the intelligence 
services, one must also consider its powers within the broader UK intelligence framework, 
which comprises the parliamentary and judicial branches of state, as well as civil society. It is 
striking how broad and permissive the executive’s legislative powers are compared to those 
of the parliamentary and judicial branches, as discussed above. Given the executive’s broad, 
and conflicting, roles within both control and oversight of the intelligence agencies, a more 
satisfactory approach would be to carefully limit its future role to that only of control, with 
oversight responsibility vested in Parliament and the judiciary, both of which are more 
independent from a presentational point of view. 
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CHAPTER 4 – THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY 
COMMITTEE
249
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Although a state’s system of intelligence oversight is, ‘the product of its system of 
government, politics, history and culture’250, broadly speaking, it relies upon a series of 
checks and balances from the three branches of state, as well as from a range of outside 
bodies.
251
 Parliamentary oversight is essential given that the contribution of parliamentarians, 
as citizens’ elected representatives, is the most democratically legitimate means of state 
scrutiny.
252
 In order to provide effective oversight within intelligence, an area already 
shrouded in a ‘veil of secrecy’253, parliamentary oversight institutions must be robust, with 
meaningful powers enabling them to hold the agencies, and executive, to account. 
 
In the United Kingdom, parliamentary scrutiny is provided in the form of the Intelligence and 
Security Committee, established by the Intelligence Services Act 1994 to review the security 
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and intelligence agencies’, ‘policy, administration and expenditure.’254 The extent to which it 
has provided an effective means of parliamentary scrutiny is much disputed, especially given 
the somewhat subdued response of its reports investigating counter terrorism issues after 
9/11.
255
 This chapter will analyse the structure and powers of the ISC, its relationship with 
the executive, and its response to allegations of complicity in the practice of extraordinary 
rendition, in order to assess its role within the UK’s intelligence oversight network. Since the 
ISC is the most visibly active means of intelligence oversight, this chapter will be somewhat 
longer than the others within this thesis, in order to properly analyse its work and role. 
 
 
4.2 The ISC’s Structure and Powers: Theory and Practice  
 
The ISC was conceived as a means by which to ensure critical parliamentary involvement in 
intelligence oversight
256
 after the controversies besetting the agencies during the 1980s and 
1990s.
257
 However, given the reactive nature of this legislation, the current oversight 
framework consists of, ‘an unsatisfactory, “compartmentalised” system of review that fails to 
close the gaps.’258 The ISC’s powers, for example, are heavily curbed by the comparative 
influence of the executive within intelligence oversight. This section will consider in detail 
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the legislative provisions concerning the ISC’s structure, membership, powers and access to 
information.
259
  
 
The ISC’s ‘constitutionally unique’260 status as a statutory parliamentary committee, as 
established in s10(1) ISA 1994, affects its powers in terms of its reports, access to 
information and ability to hear evidence from certain witnesses. The Committee is structured 
in this way due to, ‘reasons of national security...’261; the sensitive nature of the information 
with which the Committee deals necessitates a body which is not primarily responsible to 
Parliament and has lesser powers than a select committee. However, in reality, the reasons for 
retaining the ISC’s status are ‘more apparent than real’.262 Indeed, it is arguable that if the 
ISC was structured as a select committee, it would gain greater legitimacy given, ‘the 
important and valuable signal it would send that the oversight process was properly 
independent of the executive.’263  
 
The ISC comprises nine serving Members of Parliament from the Commons and the Lords, 
chosen by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, as 
established by s10(2) ISA 1994. The Committee meets frequently, interviewing dozens of 
witnesses in order to produce its reports, and participating in foreign exchange 
                                                          
259
 These are contained within s10 and Schedule 3 ISA 1994. 
260
 Leigh in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 87; Bochel, Defty, & Dunn, ‘Scrutinising the Secret State: 
Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence and Security Service’ (2010) 38(3) Policy and Politics 483, 484. 
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 Rifkind (n 175) 8. 
262
 HAC, Accountability of the Security Service (n 227), paras. 21, 36; the ‘key difference is that under the 
statutory procedure the final word rests with the executive, whereas under the select committee procedure the 
final word rests with Parliament’, para. 35. 
263
 HAC, Accountability of the Security Service (n 227), paras. 38, 41; this has been echoed by the ISC itself in, 
ISC, ‘Annual Report 2010-2011’ (n 78) 81-2. 
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programmes.
264
 New members face a ‘steep learning curve’265 in order to understand the 
challenges facing the intelligence community, and to carry out their role with a degree of 
specialist knowledge.
266
 At a presentational level, therefore, the ISC appears willing to 
proactively exercise its oversight responsibilities, although parliamentary involvement in 
intelligence oversight carries with it the potential risk of ISC members sensationalising 
intelligence, or leaking sensitive information
267
. However, one has only to read the 
Committee’s reports in order to ascertain that the former is not a legitimate concern; they are 
very restrained in their treatment of intelligence matters.
268
 As for the latter issue, ISC 
members have not leaked a single issue to date.
269
 This could be because intelligence is an 
area which holds, ‘little opportunity for personal recognition or political advantage’270, 
meaning that Committee members are unlikely to ignite party political issues. Indeed, the 
way in which the Committee completes its work suggests that the above concerns may be 
based upon little else but a desire to discredit the exercise of parliamentary scrutiny as a form 
of intelligence oversight. 
 
At the heart of the ISC’s effectiveness is the extent to which it balances its analytic function 
with the need to retain a constructive working relationship with the agencies.
271
 On one hand, 
                                                          
264
 Leigh in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 90; Defty, A, ‘Educating Parliamentarians about Intelligence: the Role 
of the British Intelligence and Security Committee’ (2008) 61(4) Parliamentary Affairs 621, 633. 
265
 Ibid (Defty), 629. 
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 DCAF, ‘Parliamentary Oversight of Intelligence Services’ (n 252), 3; Schreier in Born & Caparini (n 7) 44; 
Leigh in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 90. 
267
 Ibid (Born, Johnson & Leigh) 8. 
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Committee’ (n 264), 627. 
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 Caparini in Born & Caparini (n 7) 19. 
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the ISC’s relationship with the agencies, built on trust, has allowed the Committee to carry 
out its mandate without excessive opposition.
272
 However, this proximity to the agencies 
risks members becoming “institutionalized”, and losing their independence.273 Although there 
is nothing to suggest a deliberately biased approach on the part of the ISC, some of the 
Committee’s recent conclusions have been somewhat uncritical of the agencies, including 
those in ‘Rendition’, the ISC’s report into alleged agency complicity in extraordinary 
rendition.
274
 In order to ensure the democratic legitimacy of parliamentary intelligence 
oversight,
275
 it is therefore submitted that a more satisfactory model might incorporate a 
number of intelligence specialists within the Committee’s membership.276 This would both 
answer claims of insufficient expertise on the part of ISC members, and give the Committee 
more confidence in making its judgements and recommendations.  
 
The ISC’s mandate, as detailed in s10(1) ISA 1994, holds that the Committee may only 
scrutinise the agencies’, ‘expenditure, administration and policy.’ The provision therefore 
does not directly authorise the ISC to consider operational matters. Indeed, the wording of 
s10(1) may be interpreted to authorise the ISC’s scrutiny of the effectiveness and, 
‘management of the intelligence community’277 rather than its propriety. Given that the most 
pertinent questions about the agencies’ actions revolve around their operational activities, 
especially in relation to torture and extraordinary rendition, s10(1) effectively attempts to 
                                                          
272
 Rifkind (n 175) 2, also 3-4. 
273
 Caparini in Born & Caparini (n 7) 14, 19; Schreier in Born & Caparini (n 7) 44; DCAF, ‘Parliamentary 
Oversight of Intelligence Services’ (n 252), 4. 
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strip the ISC of full powers of scrutiny
278
, thus fragmenting intelligence oversight across 
different institutions.
279
 This makes it difficult for a parliamentary body to draw meaningful 
conclusions and make attainable recommendations, which is especially concerning in relation 
to the allegations of complicity in torture, since it may prevent the production of truly 
exhaustive and authoritative reports.  
 
In practice, however, the ISC has considered operational matters, as demonstrated by the 
subject matter of its 2007 report, ‘Rendition’, which examined the agencies’ alleged 
complicity in the practice of extraordinary rendition.
280
 Widely held opinion, including that of 
the current ISC Chairman, is that the Committee deliberately expanded its remit to do so.
281
 
Defty is more conservative in his opinion that whilst the Committee has kept ‘fairly 
rigidly’282 within its s10(1) boundaries, it has only slightly ventured into consideration of 
operational matters.
283
 This difference in opinion could be due to the fact that the line 
between policy and operational details is very thin
284
 and therefore easily confused; 
intelligence operations are necessarily carried out under broader policy objectives. Therefore, 
despite the suggestion that the ISC’s second report into Binyam Mohamed was, ‘a matter of 
                                                          
278
 Leigh in Born, Johnson & Leigh (n 9) 88. Dorrill calls the ISC ‘toothless’ for the same reason; Dorrill (n 24) 
780. 
279
 Born in Born & Caparini (n 7) 169. 
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 ISC, ‘Rendition’ (n 21); Rifkind (n 175) 3, 6; Bochel, Defty & Dunn (n 260) 484. 
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 Rifkind (n 175) 3, 6. 
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effectiveness in implementing policy’ in Johnson (n 115) 72. 
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Government policy not Agency operation’285, one has to question whether the two can easily 
be separated.
286
 The broadening of the ISC’s remit indicates that existing statutory provisions 
should be updated to include operational issues formally within the ISC’s mandate, and to 
thus provide a clear basis for the Committee’s future investigations.287 In its Annual Report 
for 2010-2011, the ISC itself recommended such legislative changes in order to parallel 
development in intelligence practices, and to remedy the fact that the Committee’s, ‘remit 
and powers have evolved beyond the de minimis position set out in the 1994 Act.’288 
  
In terms of its investigative ability, the ISC may initiate inquiries of its own accord,
289
 having 
done so especially prolifically during the last few years. However, given its scarce resources, 
members are almost wholly dependent upon the agencies to contribute meaningfully to the 
ISC’s reports290, since they have, ‘no way of checking on…what they are told.’291 Given the 
fundamental role of parliamentary intelligence oversight, this reliance upon the agencies has 
the potential to undermine the ISC’s ability to provide thorough and unbiased scrutiny.292 
Again, the ISC itself has recommended, and requested, more assistance with investigative 
and research resources.
293
 The Committee may request witnesses to give evidence, but is 
                                                          
285
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287
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unable to summon them; since the most relevant evidence would be from “inside” sources294, 
those also most likely to refuse to appear before the ISC, this again potentially constrains its 
ability to make accurate, objective conclusions.
295
 In order to remove concerns that the ISC is 
too close to the agencies
296
, more evidence could be taken from outside sources, including 
journalists, NGOs and international bodies.
297
 The wider the range of sources consulted in the 
course of the ISC’s investigations, the more effective the Committee will be in its duty of, 
‘protecting the state as a whole…rather than narrower political or sectoral interests.’298 
 
The ISC is somewhat restrained in terms of its access to information, given that it cannot 
request specific documents, only general “information”299, which the agencies or Secretary of 
State may refuse to disclose if they judge it to be ‘sensitive information’300. This discretionary 
statutory regime301 therefore allows the agencies, and executive, a certain amount of influence 
in its dealings with the ISC. However, the Committee generally receives more information 
than the bare minimum by virtue of its relationship with the agencies, maintained over years 
of cooperation.
302
 This is not satisfactory; rather than gaining access to extra information 
through its reputation, the ISC should have the potential to access all intelligence information 
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by statutory right, even if it should choose not to fully exercise this.
303
 In any case, the 
executive’s powers over the ISC’s access to information entrenches the perception that the 
ISC, ‘cannot be trusted with sensitive information’304, and thus detracts from the legitimacy 
and authority of parliamentary oversight. 
 
The final aspect of the ISC’s powers to be scrutinised is its ability, or lack of, to control the 
content of its reports. As detailed in s10(5)-(7) ISA 1994, the Committee reports primarily to 
the Prime Minister, who presents its work to Parliament after making any necessary 
redactions. It has been stressed that any such changes are not made arbitrarily; the ISC 
undertakes a balancing exercise before agreeing to suggested redactions.
305
 However, without 
statistics showing how many challenges are upheld, or not, it is impossible to know how 
rigorously the Committee treats such requests. Evidently, some of the information accessed 
by the ISC will not be suitable for publication, but, as far as possible, a parliamentary 
oversight body must be allowed to publish their conclusions and recommendations without 
restriction. The fact that it is the Prime Minister, a potentially interested party, who suggests 
possible redactions, enforces the view that the Committee is not trusted to report responsibly, 
thereby undermining its position as representative of, and responsible to, Parliament as a 
whole.
306
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Having considered the ISC’s structure and powers, it appears that the current statutory 
framework is insufficient to deal with the Committee’s role of parliamentary scrutiny; in the 
Committee’s own words, the legislation is, ‘significantly out of date.’307 The fact that the 
ISC’s powers are subjected to those of the executive, and agencies, means that it appears less 
critical than would be the case if it were seen to be more independent. This raises concerns 
about its treatment of issues including alleged complicity in rendition, given the absolute 
prohibition of these practices in domestic and international law, and the need for domestic 
oversight mechanisms to be unequivocal in upholding the agencies’ related legal obligations.  
 
 
4.3 The ISC and the Executive 
 
An essential aspect of the ISC’s contribution to intelligence oversight is the extent to which it 
provides a check against the executive’s powers308, and thus, ‘ensures a stable, politically 
bipartisan approach’309 to intelligence. However, the apparent proximity between the ISC and 
the executive raises concerns about the “ownership” of the Committee and its powers310, and 
whether this affects its ability to provide meaningful and independent oversight. This has 
partly been covered in this thesis; the ISC’s powers, or lack thereof, suggest a system in 
which the executive is dominant, given its more intimate knowledge of threats to national 
                                                          
307
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308
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security, and the innate secrecy of such information.
311
 In order to assess where the balance 
of power lies between the executive and ISC in practice, it is necessary to examine the 
relationship between the two in greater detail.  
 
The legislative provisions relating to the ISC demonstrate the considerable influence that the 
executive may theoretically wield over the Committee, and the corresponding risk of political 
deference, manifested through party political divides or an unwillingness to criticise 
individuals’ actions.312 This is enforced by the fact that some of the Committee’s reports 
remain unpublished, thus undermining its investigative work and, ‘increasing the 
government’s control over policy…and…insulating [it] from criticism.’313 Within the ISC’s 
reports, the perception that intelligence is inherently useful and good resounds through 
them
314
, which perhaps precludes their ability to be critical.  
 
Despite the appearance that the executive exercises considerable power in its relationship 
with the ISC, Forcese, writing from a Canadian comparative perspective, emphasises that the 
Committee’s reports merit a substantial response from the government, and thus cumulatively 
help to create, ‘a rich corpus of material explaining and justifying government policies.’315 
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The fact that the present executive has actively sought the ISC’s opinions on several policy 
issues
316
 suggests that it is willing to have a more consultative partnership with the 
Committee. This contrasts to previous governments’ approach to parliamentary oversight, 
where, ‘resistance to greater openness came not from the security and intelligence agencies, 
but from Whitehall and Government.’317 Indeed, previous ISC reports called for increased 
Ministerial involvement in the oversight process
318
, whilst also noting executive reluctance to 
interact with those parliamentary bodies whose remit incidentally touched upon 
intelligence.
319
 Central to the ISC’s future success is therefore the extent to which the 
executive accepts that further to cooperating with the Committee, in terms of giving evidence 
to its hearings, they must also implement its recommended reforms where necessary. This 
would both allow the ISC to properly fulfil its statutory role of scrutinising policy, as within 
s10(1) ISA 1994, and ensure that the executive take its reports into account within its 
decision-making processes.  
 
When assessing the respective powers of the executive, and the ISC, one must remember that, 
‘the choice is not between executive or legislative sovereignty…[t]he challenge is to use the 
                                                          
316
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best attributes of both branches’320. Therefore, the most effective relationship between the 
two would both respect the executive’s ultimate responsibility for the agencies whilst 
retaining a meaningful parliamentary contribution. Given that the current balance of power 
lies with the executive, it falls upon the executive and agencies to consciously ensure the 
proper review and implementation of the ISC’s recommendations.321 It is also imperative that 
the ISC itself more confidently and independently inhabits its role; by actively demonstrating 
its critical function, the Committee will enforce that it is a distinct and independent oversight 
body, rather than a mere Whitehall puppet.
322
   
 
 
4.4 The ISC and Extraordinary Rendition  
 
In July 2007, the ISC produced ‘Rendition’323, a report which analysed the mounting 
allegations of UK complicity in extraordinary rendition, and followed closely behind the 
Committee’s previous report into the handling of detainees under UK custody overseas.324 
Given that these reports concern issues intrinsically linked to the agencies’ operational 
policies in the “War on Terror”, they are instructive in revealing the Committee’s approach to 
oversight of the agencies. This section will therefore explore the content of both reports, 
especially ‘Rendition’, and their implications for parliamentary oversight. 
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Prior to the commission, and publication, of ‘Rendition’, there were mounting reports from a 
number of sources which indicated concerns about the extent of the UK’s role in the US-led 
rendition programme; as the ISC itself admits, ‘[w]ithin a few months of 9/11, allegations of 
“Extraordinary Rendition”…began to surface in the media.’325 These allegations were 
supported by evidence amassed by journalists, NGOs and interested bodies, and thus 
presented a prima facie case for the government to answer, or rebut.
326
 The allegations of 
complicity were also considered by the executive in Parliament; in January 2006 the Foreign 
Secretary issued a written ministerial statement denying that the government had granted 
permission to any cases of rendition since 9/11.
327
 Given the mounting levels of interest in the 
issue, both within Parliament and amongst the general public, it is somewhat surprising that 
the ISC did not produce ‘Rendition’ until July 2007. However, this is perhaps understandable 
when one considers that the Committee had produced two special reports in quick 
succession
328
, as well as its annual reports, and has scarce resources limiting its capacity for 
investigation.  
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Before producing ‘Rendition’, in 2005 the ISC published a report which considered whether 
UK officers were aware of any mistreatment of detainees held in Afghanistan, Guantanamo 
Bay and Iraq, whether appropriate training was delivered for the purpose of interviewing such 
detainees, and the extent of ministerial knowledge of any concerns raised.
329
 The report 
identified several instances in which UK intelligence personnel had concerns about the 
possible mistreatment of detainees, or breach of their rights, by the US authorities, and a few 
circumstances where the conduct of UK personnel themselves had been called into question; 
however, ‘[a]part from the limited and specific breaches to which we have referred, [the 
ISC]…found no evidence that UK intelligence personnel abused detainees.’330  
 
 
In its conclusions, the report emphasised the difficult context in which the agencies operate, 
and the need for valuable intelligence in order to anticipate and counteract terrorist threats.
331
 
In relation to instances where concerns were directly related to the conduct of UK 
intelligence staff, the officers in question were said to have been unaware of the correct 
procedures to follow.
332
 The ISC also highlighted the agencies’ failure to deliver appropriate 
training in relation to officers’ lack of guidance about the Geneva Conventions and their 
application to detainees under UK supervision.
333
 Guidance has now been issued relating to 
the treatment of detainees, and procedures to follow in cases of possible mistreatment,
 334
 
although this has taken years, given that concerns regarding agency personnel were known 
for years prior to the ISC report. The 2005 report noted that any allegations of mistreatment 
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were reported, and treated, as, ‘isolated incidents’335, and not indicative of a deliberate policy 
to mistreat detainees. The Committee also criticised the fact that, in many cases, Ministers 
were not informed or consulted about developments in relation to the interrogation and 
treatment of detainees until long after they had materialised, and been resolved.
336
  
 
 
Although the issues considered in the 2005 report concerned a “grey area” of the UK 
agencies’ practices, the ISC’s report was confined to criticisms relating to procedural matters. 
In response to the allegations of mistreatment, for example, the Committee did not criticise 
the actions of the US and UK agencies per se, but focused on the procedure by which agency 
superiors were notified, Ministers consulted and any training implemented.
337
 Moreover, at 
several points throughout the report the ISC did not appear to analyse the issues raised in 
sufficient detail. For example, the Committee accepted without question MI5’s assertion that 
the UK officers involved in incidents of mistreatment were simply unaware of UK policy on 
the matter
338
; this may indeed have be the case, but the serious nature of the allegations 
warranted further investigation. Furthermore, the report devoted only two paragraphs to 
“ghost prisoners”339, although such detainees are central to a discussion of rendition. 
Although the ISC was proactive in commissioning and driving the 2005 report
340
, by limiting 
its analytical ability as detailed above, it signalled that it was more comfortable considering 
the agencies’ management than their propriety.341 In this way, the Committee’s approach in 
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the 2005 report appeared to demonstrate that in future reports it would again be hesitant in 
criticising the UK agencies’ actions in relation to the practice of extraordinary rendition.  
 
The ISC’s 2005 report therefore left a number of questions for the Committee to consider in 
‘Rendition’ including whether appropriate guidance on rendition would be made available to 
personnel, whether more would be discovered about “ghost prisoners”342, and whether 
ministers would be informed or consulted about alleged instances of rendition. However, the 
overriding theme which links the two reports is the necessity of balancing the need for 
agencies to share and receive intelligence with the need to uphold international legal 
obligations, and agencies’ ethical policies. Given that most shared intelligence is disclosed 
without revealing its source, or the means by which it was gained, the agencies have to assess 
its credibility in order to judge whether to use it
343
; it is this assessment of intelligence which 
lies at the heart of the ISC’s 2005 and 2007 reports.  
 
The terms of reference of the ‘Rendition’ report were two-fold; firstly to consider whether the 
UK agencies had, ‘any knowledge of, and/or involvement in, rendition operations…and 
[secondly] their overall policy for intelligence sharing with foreign liaison services 
(principally the United States) in this context.’344 These appeared to be comprehensive 
objectives, given the range of allegations the Committee was to consider. However, the very 
broadness of the first objective made the substantive content of the report dependent upon the 
interpretation of “rendition”, meaning that certain aspects of complicity in torture, which 
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covers a very broad range of acts
345
, may not have been considered. This is emphasised by 
the fact that the report distinguished five separate “types” of rendition.346 The second 
objective of the 2007 report tied in with the dilemmas associated with increasing international 
intelligence cooperation. 
  
 
It was further suggested by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition 
(APPGER) that the ISC should also consider the system of executive involvement in 
‘Rendition’, and a third term of inquiry was also proposed;  
 
‘Is the practice of extraordinary rendition making Britain more or less secure, and 
what, if any, changes in Government policy are required?’347 
 
It is submitted that the first suggestion would indeed be a natural term of inquiry, given that 
an understanding of ministerial involvement in the intelligence process is central to the 
agencies’ alleged complicity in rendition, with the ISC examining this issue in its 2005 
report. However, the proposed third term of inquiry would be too broad for the Committee to 
consider; although it may consider the agencies’ policies, as established through s10(1) ISA 
1994
348, political judgements lie outside the ISC’s limited remit. It was explicitly stated that, 
as in the 2005 report, ‘Rendition’ would not analyse the legality of the US agencies’ 
actions.
349
 Although it is true that the ISC’s remit extends only to the UK agencies, such a 
                                                          
345
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statement could be read as meaning that the Committee was unwilling to consider any US-
derived material during the course of its investigations. The difficulties faced by domestic 
oversight bodies, with regards to unravelling international intelligence cooperation, mean that 
it would therefore have been difficult for the Committee to successfully fulfil their second 
term of reference. It is therefore interesting that when apportioning blame for any 
wrongdoing, the report’s conclusions focus on the US’s actions rather than the UK’s350 
despite not formally considering the propriety or legality of the US agencies’ actions.351   
 
 
Much in the same vein as the ISC’s 2005 report, ‘Rendition’ adopted, ‘a rather sober, non-
sensational approach to an issue which is often the subject of lurid speculation.’352 This 
perhaps implicitly signalled that the ISC would be unwilling to indulge in the “conspiracy 
theories” concerning possible UK complicity in torture and rendition. The report firstly 
defined extraordinary rendition by distinguishing it from four other instances of rendition.
353
 
However, this distinction appears somewhat artificial given the potential overlap between the 
categories of rendition; for example, although the ISC argued that ‘the transfer of battlefield 
detainees from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay would fall into the category of “Military 
Renditions”’354, if torture of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment was practised during the 
detention, as has been alleged in some instances, could it not also be classified as 
extraordinary rendition? The same argument would also be relevant for instances of 
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“Rendition to Detention”. The narrowness of these definitions, limiting the circumstances 
which could be classified as extraordinary renditions, therefore reduced the extent to which 
UK agencies could technically be found to be complicit in the practice.   
 
 
In terms of structure, ‘Rendition’ set out the legal framework and background surrounding 
the use of renditions before and during the “War on Terror”, and considered the increasing 
need for international intelligence cooperation. It then considered four case studies of alleged 
victims of the practice, distinguishing them on the basis of facts. This approach was 
somewhat unusual, since the ISC generally does not consider individual cases.
355
 However, 
this means of structuring the report maintained the overriding argument that the cases 
mentioned were unique and not symptomatic of general policy.
356
 The report then considered 
ethical concerns raised by rendition allegations, the role of the UK agencies, and the issue of 
“ghost flights” before making conclusions and recommendations. The report’s content 
therefore appears comprehensive, although a section considering ministerial knowledge and 
involvement would have been useful, given the ISC’s criticisms of this in its 2005 report. 
Furthermore, a discussion of the meaning of the term “complicity” would have assisted in 
identifying the range of acts referred to within the allegations, and would have therefore 
provided a more authoritative account of the UK’s liability. The length of the report also 
somewhat detracts from its content;  the sections on ‘legal framework’,  ‘the nature of 
intelligence sharing’ and ‘ethical dilemmas’ were very short considering their importance to 
the subject matter and conclusions of the report.  
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The ISC’s conclusions in ‘Rendition’ followed the opinion that the agencies were slow to 
realise the extent of the US’s policy of extraordinary rendition and its implications for 
them.
357
 If one follows this argument then it is implied that any complicity on the part of UK 
agencies was provided unknowingly. In terms of the specific cases which were detailed, the 
Committee found that the agencies, ‘acted properly’358 and were not involved in the rendition 
of Martin Mubanga. A UK officer had interviewed Mubanga during his detention in Zambia, 
without reporting any evident mistreatment, and the UK agencies knew of the US’s plan to 
render him to Guantanamo Bay, also notifying the relevant Ministers.
359
 Given this, and the 
changes occurring within US foreign policy at this time
360
, one might have expected the 
agencies to have kept a closer watch on Mubanga or to have intervened once they learned of 
his future deportation.  
 
 
In the case of Binyam Mohamed, it was found that ‘there is a reasonable probability’ that 
intelligence passed from the UK agencies to the US was later used in his interrogation.
361
 
Once again the agencies had interviewed him during his detention, without reporting any 
mistreatment; moreover, although they were aware of the plan to transport him to 
Guantanamo Bay, they did not seek assurances as to his treatment.
362
 The ISC called this 
latter failure ‘understandable’ due to the agencies’ lack of knowledge of US policy, yet 
                                                          
357
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‘regrettable’363, and failed to confirm or deny Mohamed’s allegations.364 Evidence which has 
been provided in reports by outside bodies, and through information divulged in court 
cases
365
 would appear to show that Mohamed was indeed involved in the practice of 
extraordinary rendition. If true, this raises the question of why the ISC appeared unwilling to 
robustly criticise the agencies for their role in Mohamed’s rendition, and whether they were 
aware of the nature of the agencies’ actions or not.  
 
 
In the case of Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna, the ISC found that the sharing of 
information between the US and UK agencies about the men’s movements was ‘routine’ and 
could not have been expected to have been acted on, especially since it was covered by a 
caveat.
366
 Indeed, the Committee said that it was, ‘clear that [the men’s arrest] was not at the 
instigation of the Security Service.’367 However, there remain unanswered questions about 
why intelligence was passed to the US authorities rather than the Gambian authorities, and 
why the men’s bags were not searched the second time they attempted to fly to Banjul, if no 
action was expected through this shared intelligence. Given that these events occurred 
subsequent to the renditions of Martin Mubanga and Binyam Mohamed, amongst others, it is 
possible that the UK agencies would have had misgivings about how the shared intelligence 
might be used, although perhaps not if the incidents were dealt with independently, and not 
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considered as an evolving pattern. However, even if the latter option is more accurate, it 
demonstrates a flawed assessment of the recurring instances of alleged rendition. 
 
 
In ‘Rendition’, the ISC noted that the agencies at all times acted appropriately and according 
to policy.
368
 However given the number of conflicting reports, and evidence detailing alleged 
involvement in rendition, there remains the question of whether it is true that the UK 
agencies, being aware of the US’s change in foreign policy and the mistreatment of detainees 
in UK custody overseas, and having witnessed a growing number of renditions to 
Guantanamo Bay, did not have suspicions of there being a real risk of torture or mistreatment 
occurring? If this is true then the ISC’s report does not detail sufficient evidence to support 
such a conclusion. The necessary redaction of the Committee’s reports makes it difficult for 
the Committee to persuasively argue that their conclusions are supported by compelling and 
accurate evidence, since even if this exists it is unseen by the public at large. This is perhaps 
where the ISC could profit from increased collaboration with NGOs and outsider bodies to 
enhance the authority of their reports from a public perspective. In the absence of such, and 
especially given the increasing amount of information which would seem to indicate 
otherwise, it is difficult to agree with the ISC’s conclusions in ‘Rendition’.  
 
 
A pressing issue raised by ‘Rendition’ was the extent to which the ISC should consider the 
UK intelligence agencies’ adherence to human rights norms. Born argues that scrutiny of the 
agencies’ protection of human rights is a key function of legislative accountability.369 
However, thus far, this has not been followed by the ISC; as Gill notes, its reports before 
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2005 contained, ‘the complete absence of any explicit reference to human rights.’370 
Although the ISC dealt with torture and lack of due process in ‘Rendition’, the report focused 
upon the agencies’ efficiency and management371 and thus once more, ‘firmly situat[ed] 
questions of human rights and ethics within the framework of the importance to the UK of 
intelligence sharing with the US and, implicitly, the importance of not disrupting this 
relationship.’372  
 
 
The question of whether the ISC may consider human rights issues rests upon its remit. If the 
Committee strictly confines itself to s10(1) ISA 1994 by considering the agencies’ ‘policy, 
administration and expenditure’373, and thus their management374, then it may legitimately 
produce reports which do not consider human rights issues, or do so only in a cursory 
manner. However, given the ISC’s extension into considering operational issues and, ‘the 
harm that can be done to civil liberties and human rights by intelligence agencies, this is 
unsatisfactory.’375 Issues such as alleged complicity in the rendition and treatment of 
detainees in UK custody, concern the agencies’ propriety, of which a key part is their 
adherence to human rights.
376
 The argument for the ISC to consider human rights is therefore 
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a pressing one, especially given the context of international legal obligations under which the 
agencies operate.  
 
 
At the same time that the ISC has produced its work relating to rendition and intelligence 
oversight, parliamentary committees not formally mandated in respect of the UK intelligence 
and security agencies have also begun to consider these issues. The most notable 
contributions in this area have come from the APPGER, Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(JCHR), Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) and the Home Affairs Committee (HAC).
377
 The 
very fact that such bodies have ventured into the realm of intelligence suggest that they 
recognise ‘perceived limitations in the work of the ISC’378, and seek to remedy these through 
their own reports. Their respective reports appear to be more overtly critical than the ISC’s, 
thus upholding a critical function of parliamentary scrutiny.
379
 However, perhaps as a 
consequence of this, the UK agencies and the executive may be more likely to cooperate 
with, the ISC. The involvement of other parliamentary committees in intelligence oversight 
somewhat undermines the Committee’s position, which reinforces the argument that in order 
for it to regain its reputation as an independent and impartial body, the ISC must consciously 
become more critical of the agencies, and distance itself from any outside, and potentially 
corrupting, influence.  
                                                          
377
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
If ‘Parliaments need high-quality intelligence in order to make appropriate decisions on 
national security’380, it is in their interests to ensure that the intelligence and security agencies 
maintain high standards and implement effective procedures. The ISC can only do so if it is 
granted wider statutory powers, since the existing legislation curbs its ability to work 
independently and unhindered by outside influences. It has been suggested that any changes 
to the ISC’s structure and powers would damage the relationship between the Committee and 
the agencies, and thus ‘set back effective scrutiny.’381 However, given that the agencies have 
often been said to welcome the work of oversight bodies
382
, they might otherwise be expected 
to recognise the ISC’s extended powers as constructive to the future of intelligence. 
 
 
Generally speaking, the ISC has been restrained in its approach to the issue of possible 
complicity in rendition and torture, as demonstrated by the conclusions of its 2005 and 2007 
reports, produced in the face of emerging information about the renditions cycles. Although 
the new Chairman of the ISC argues that the Committee will, ‘be critical where [it] see[s] 
failures or shortcomings’383 this has arguably not been the case so far; criticisms have focused 
on issues relating to management rather than the substantive content of the allegations made 
against the agencies. Although this may be appropriate for an annual report, it is surprising 
that the ISC, having initiated the reports in question, did not proceed to robustly investigate 
and analyse the numerous allegations made against the UK intelligence and security agencies. 
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The Committee’s failure to do so emphasises both its structural deficiencies, and overt 
deference to the executive, neither of which are advisable characteristics in an independent 
oversight body.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Although the primary means by which to hold intelligence agencies accountable must, 
necessarily, come from the executive and parliamentary branches, judges play an important 
role as the, ‘final arbiters of the statutory powers that security and intelligence agencies 
possess.’384 This is because robust judicial decision-making in the realm of intelligence can 
highlight inappropriate practices, chastise those responsible, impose remedies and 
sanctions385, suggest reform to existing legislation and thus generally contribute to an 
institutionalized oversight regime. Judicial decisions in cases related to alleged complicity in 
extraordinary rendition reveal much about the court’s relationship with the executive, and the 
importance attached to the particular constitutional principles and civil liberties at stake. 
 
Decisions made within both the domestic and international context initially acted as a catalyst 
forcing regulation of the agencies in the 1980s and 1990s.386 However, given the executive’s 
tendency to advocate secrecy of the agencies’ actions in pursuance of the ‘War on Terror’, 
and the resort to controversial administrative measures in order to accommodate sensitive 
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issues within the justice system387, the judiciary’s decision-making capacity has been 
considerably challenged in recent years. Unlike their foreign counterparts, judges in England 
and Wales are not involved in the prior authorisation of agency action, and have no power to 
strike down legislation, meaning that their direct involvement in agency activity is limited to 
incidental and ex post facto review. Courts are only able to consider rendition and torture 
insofar as these issues arise in on-going court proceedings, thus limiting the noticeable effect 
of judicial decision-making on the UK intelligence and security agencies. In turn, this has 
been exacerbated by a general judicial unwillingness to challenge executive discretion in 
national security affairs and policy decisions.388  
 
This chapter will therefore consider the theoretical role of the judiciary within intelligence 
oversight, before looking at how the judiciary conducts itself in practice, in relation to the 
UK’s intelligence legislation. It will then analyse how the practice of extraordinary rendition, 
in relation to the intelligence and security agencies, has arisen within specific cases in the 
UK, and how the courts have considered the issues of secrecy, integral to the agencies’ 
operations, in the context of making decisions related to the state’s national security.  
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5.2 The Judicial Function within Intelligence Oversight: Theory 
 
The role of the judiciary within intelligence oversight is two-fold; firstly, they provide 
incidental and ex post facto review of the agencies’ actions arising from legal issues brought 
within the legal system389; and secondly, they authorize certain agency actions which would 
otherwise be forbidden, but which are deemed necessary in specific circumstances390. The 
first of these functions is the most important given that judicial decision-making, within the 
realm of intelligence, relates to the exercise of judicial deference in the consideration of 
matters central to a state’s security391. In this way, ‘the willingness of the courts to strike 
down laws and actions deemed to be unlawful or unconstitutional’392 demonstrates the extent 
of judicial activism within a state at any one time. 
 
In terms of intelligence oversight, the courts have generally been seen to have a minimal role 
in overseeing the agencies’ actions, which has been exacerbated by the tendency of certain 
politicians to characterise judicial decision-making as undemocratic.393 However, although 
the judiciary’s role in intelligence oversight is not as central as that of the other two branches 
of state, it creates ‘anticipatory control’394, by which the agencies are aware that their actions 
could subsequently be examined in a judicial setting. The very independence of the judiciary, 
and the fact that they are a less “democratic” branch of state than the legislature or 
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executive395, means that they provide a purely detached form of review, untouched by 
political considerations. Judicial decisions are necessarily grounded in legal norms and 
principles396, meaning that judges’ interpretations of the agencies’ domestic and international 
legal obligations define the limits of their permissible behaviour. In order to facilitate 
effective judicial decision-making, any legislation relating to intelligence oversight must 
therefore be precisely drafted in order to provide a ‘reference point’ for judges if raised in a 
case.397 This relates to the argument that such laws must provide for sanctions to be applied if 
they are broken; without meaningful penalties, there is arguably little incentive for the 
agencies to adhere to a legislative framework.398 Therefore, such developments must be 
accompanied by robust interpretation of these laws, and imposition of sanctions, in order to 
be meaningful.399 
 
Within its role of intelligence oversight, the judiciary has traditionally been charged with 
protecting citizens’ fundamental rights and civil liberties from the possibility of an over-
zealous executive.400 In times of heightened security concerns, it is increasingly important 
that the judiciary acts robustly to retain the state’s constitutional principles. The potential 
consequences of the executive preventing the judiciary, whether consciously or not, from 
fully exercising their decision-making powers are wide; the executive’s influence in 
intelligence and security would continue largely unchallenged, extraordinary powers would 
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begin to be viewed as ordinary due to the trend of ‘legislative creep’401, and the intelligence 
agencies would potentially begin to view abrogation of constitutional principles as justified 
under increasing numbers of circumstances.402 In relation to the practice of extraordinary 
rendition, where the issues concerned involve torture, illegal detention and lack of due 
process, this would severely curb the fundamental rights of the individuals involved, and 
would limit the judiciary’s oversight of the agencies’, and executive’s, actions. 
 
 
5.3 The Judicial Function within Intelligence Oversight: the UK Legislation in Practice 
 
Within the current legislative oversight framework, the judicial function is channelled into 
three judicial roles established by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000; the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT),
403
  Intelligence Services Commissioner
404
 and 
Interception of Communications Commissioner
405
. The Commissioners, both retired judges, 
review the authorisation of warrants authorised by the relevant Secretary of State relating to 
intrusive surveillance and interference with property, and the interception of 
communications.
406
 Their role is not especially relevant to consideration of the allegations of 
complicity in extraordinary rendition with which this thesis is concerned. The IPT, however, 
considers complaints brought against the agencies by affected parties. These statutory judicial 
                                                          
401
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mechanisms were specifically created to operate effectively within the largely secret realm of 
intelligence, meaning that they therefore also have the potential to be less transparent than 
usual courtroom proceedings. This section will consider how effectively the IPT carries out 
its judicial functions, and how it fits into the broader intelligence oversight framework, given 
that it is a non-traditional judicial mechanism which operates differently to the courts.  
 
Within the current statutory oversight regime, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is a 
mechanism by which individuals may bring complaints against the misuse of the intelligence 
and security services’ statutory powers under ss65 – 70 RIPA 2000. This appears to include 
complaints relating to torture and mistreatment, since the ISC has repeatedly said that the IPT 
is the appropriate forum for complaints and allegations of complicity in extraordinary 
rendition to be addressed rather than in its own reports.
407
 However, there is some confusion 
over whether such complaints fall within the IPT’s jurisdiction, given that its powers under 
RIPA 2000 are listed as covering, ‘interception of communications; communications data; 
intrusive surveillance; directed surveillance; interference with property; covert human 
intelligence sources; investigation of protected electronic information.’408 This would 
therefore not include jurisdiction for alleged complicity in rendition. However, ss65(3)-(5) 
RIPA 2000
409 appear to allow jurisdiction over such allegations; the agencies’ alleged actions 
presumably classifies as conduct taking place in relation to the individual
410
 and which the 
complainant believes, ‘to have taken place in challengeable circumstances or to have been 
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carried out by or on behalf of any of the intelligence services.’411 Although it appears that the 
IPT therefore has jurisdiction, the potential confusion surrounding this issue has the capacity 
to be misleading for individuals seeking to make a complaint against the agencies but 
unaware of the appropriate avenue to pursue.  
  
In the case of A v B
412
, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal brought by a 
former MI5 agent seeking to uphold his Article 10 ECHR rights in a court rather than before 
the IPT, determining instead that the IPT was the clear avenue through which concerns about 
the intelligence agencies should be determined. The decision was based upon the fact that 
s65(2)(a) RIPA 2000 was held to have allocated the IPT jurisdiction over claims brought 
under s7(1)(a) HRA 1998, relating to breaches of Convention rights by public authorities.
413
 
Through this decision, the Supreme Court effectively upheld the IPT as an entirely 
appropriate form of judicial mechanism, holding that although the requirements of 
intelligence necessitated precautions in terms of the IPT’s openness, the Tribunal 
nevertheless complied with the fair trial requirements of Article 6 ECHR.
414
 Given the 
substance of this decision, it is somewhat surprising that claims alleging complicity in 
extraordinary rendition have not been brought to the IPT, but have instead been determined 
through the traditional legal route. 
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It has been argued that, ‘[t]here is a clear need for alternative avenues of redress for 
individuals who claim to have been adversely affected by the exceptional powers often 
wielded by security and intelligence agencies.’415 Indeed, it is reasonable to suggest that a 
body charged exclusively with considering truly sensitive intelligence would be able to 
effectively balance the requirement of fair due process against that of security.
416
 In Al Rawi 
and others, discussed below, Lord Brown advocated that a specialist intelligence tribunal was 
one of the only methods by which the secrecy of intelligence could be accommodated 
alongside the public interest in having such claims heard.
417
 However the IPT, in its present 
form, appears not to balance these competing interests as effectively as is possible.
418
 The 
lack of transparency regarding the Tribunal’s hearings and decision-making means that 
justice is not seen to be done in the cases it hears, which is a crucial element of judicial 
decision-making. The IPT heard its first open court hearing in July 2010, in which it upheld a 
complaint for only the fourth time in its ten year existence.
419
 Such statistics do little to instil 
confidence in the tribunal’s decision-making and protection of individuals’ rights.420 The 
legislative provisions regulating the IPT’s procedure therefore somewhat limit the full 
exercise of traditional judicial function
421
 through allowing a predominantly secret form of 
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judicial scrutiny and thus reducing the number of complaints pursued in the traditional 
manner, especially since the IPT’s decisions cannot be challenged in court.  
 
 
5.4 Extraordinary Rendition in the UK Courts 
 
Writing in 1994, Supperstone predicted future problems for the courts operating within the 
realm of intelligence in terms of, ‘the meaning that is to be given to the concept “national 
security” and its operation in practice.’422 For the purposes of this thesis, the phrase “national 
security” shall be taken to refer to, ‘the protection of the most fundamental institutions of the 
state from the threat of being undermined by its enemies…’423 The traditional approach taken 
by the judiciary has been to recognise that national security, ‘is not a question of law. It is a 
matter of judgment and policy…entrusted to the executive.’424  This general unwillingness to 
consider national security and intelligence in detail can partly be explained by the judiciary’s 
perceived lack of expertise and knowledge about the intelligence process and national 
security threats.
425
 The government’s response to unfavourable judicial decisions may also be 
a contributing factor; following the High Court’s decision in 2009 to allow publication of the 
7 redacted paragraphs relating to Binyam Mohamed’s torture, for example, the government 
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proclaimed itself, ‘deeply disappointed.’426 Indeed, the Foreign Secretary explicitly stated 
that the High Court had failed to appropriately assess the existing national security 
concerns.
427
 Although the government’s subsequent appeal was not upheld, such statements 
demonstrate a lingering perception that the exercise of independent and critical judicial 
decision-making, in the realm of intelligence and national security, is undemocratic.
428
  
 
Feldman argues that the evidential procedures employed by the courts endow them with 
sufficient appreciation of the risks and competing interests inherent within intelligence.
429
 If 
so, the obvious limitation of this approach is that it fails to allow the judiciary to openly 
rationalise and justify their decisions, so that their understanding of the intelligence process is 
not publicly acknowledged. In any event, even if the judiciary is less informed about 
intelligence affairs than the executive, it is submitted that this is not necessarily a justification 
for the judiciary not to fully scrutinise the agencies’ actions where necessary; if the role of the 
judiciary is to consider the legal, rather than policy, issues within particular proceedings, it 
does not necessarily need intelligence expertise. Indeed, it could be argued that too intimate a 
knowledge of the agencies’ operations could disproportionately influence judicial decisions 
concerned with national security and intelligence. Weight could be placed upon the 
government’s assessment of national security whilst still respecting the judiciary’s role in 
assessing policy insofar as it concerns legal rights and obligations, and, ‘publicly and 
rationally justifying its decisions...independently of any consideration of democratic 
                                                          
426
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accountability…’430 This would prevent a stifling of the judiciary’s potential role within 
intelligence oversight, by more effectively ensure that the imposition of legal sanctions and 
ex post facto review by the courts.  
 
Given that extraordinary rendition encompasses multiple elements, spans jurisdictions and 
contravenes numerous legal obligations, it is perhaps not surprising that it has been raised 
before courts in both the UK and abroad in numerous types of legal actions. Habeas corpus 
actions challenging the legality of the detainees’ detention at Guantanamo Bay have been 
considered by US courts, whilst claims for civil damages founded in tort and purported 
breaches of the Human Rights Act 1998 have been brought before the UK courts, as in the Al 
Rawi litigation, jointly brought by alleged former detainees.
431
 Extraordinary rendition has 
arisen in actions concerning the possible disclosure of intelligence information, such as the 
Binyam Mohamed litigation
432
, requests made under the Freedom of Information Act 2000
433
, 
and proceedings concerning the exercise of diplomatic relations.
434
 The practice has also been 
considered incidentally in the criminal trials of those alleged to have been tortured, for 
example Rangzieb Ahmed, who was convicted of terrorism offences but claimed that the UK 
was complicit in his torture whilst held in Pakistan.
435
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It is therefore evident that extraordinary rendition may arise in a diverse range of legal 
proceedings, and that the extent to which the courts in such proceedings consider the practice 
will depend upon the precise facts in issue. This somewhat limits the judiciary’s contribution 
to intelligence oversight; it is difficult to cohesively consider the judiciary’s approach to 
intelligence oversight, or to find recurring themes within the courts’ judgments, when any 
decision may technically be distinguished on the basis of its facts. Furthermore, it is 
submitted that the incidental nature of such oversight, and the increasing evidential 
considerations which affect such legal proceedings, means that it fails to consistently uphold 
the rights of individuals concerned, especially given the extent of international and domestic 
legal obligations in this area.  
 
In the UK there have so far been relatively few judicial decisions which have considered the 
practice of extraordinary rendition, or the substance of the allegations made against the 
agencies. For this reason, both the Binyam Mohamed and Al Rawi litigation have largely 
framed the analysis of the judiciary’s role within intelligence oversight. The Binyam 
Mohamed litigation stemmed from Mohamed’s attempts to defend himself in proceedings 
brought by the US government; in order to do so, his defence argued that it was necessary for 
them to have access to information passed from the US agencies to the UK agencies relating 
to his mistreatment. The Divisional Court considered an application for judicial review of the 
Foreign Secretary’s decision to refuse to supply this information.436 This judgment was 
particularly noteworthy in that the court considered the substance of the allegations, and 
concluded that there was an arguable case of wrongdoing, in which the UK agencies were 
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involved, however innocently.
437
 The court also found that, according to the right to a fair 
trial, the information in question was essential to Mohamed’s ability to defend the allegations 
in question, and should therefore be disclosed.
438
 The Divisional Court therefore firmly 
situated its judgment within the context of intelligence oversight, by tackling the issues of 
torture and rendition involved, and making tentative conclusions regarding the allegations in 
question. 
 
The Binyam Mohamed litigation comprised extensive satellite proceedings on issues relating 
to the publication of seven paragraphs which summarised the US’s representations to the UK 
agencies about Mohamed’s treatment. In Binyam Mohamed (No 2), the Court of Appeal 
considered whether the paragraphs had been properly restrained from publication by the UK 
courts. The Defendant contended that it was in the interests of open justice, and within the 
public interest, for the paragraphs to be published, and the court upheld this. The court 
explicitly considered its own role in intelligence-related proceedings, with Lord Judge 
recognising that open justice, and the principle of a Defendant knowing the grounds upon 
which he was successful, reflected democratic accountability.
439
 The court also analysed the 
control principle and found that the doctrine did not have a constitutional or legal basis, but 
was a development of the flexibility of intelligence cooperation.
440
 As such, it was not 
inviolable, but subject to scrutiny by the courts.
441
 The Court of Appeal’s judgment therefore 
demonstrated judicial confidence in adjudicating within the realm of intelligence, and 
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balancing the competing public interests in restraining and disclosing the information in 
question.
442
 
 
However, central to the court’s decision was the fact that a US court had already published 
the paragraphs in question in habeas corpus proceedings related to Mohamed’s detention in 
Guantanamo Bay; given this, the court held that the paragraphs did not comprise of genuinely 
secret material which might risk national security if published.
443
 Lord Neuberger and Sir 
Anthony May especially put great weight upon this factor, holding that but for the US 
publication of said paragraphs, they would have deferred to the Foreign Secretary’s 
assessment of the potential national security risks associated with their publication, regardless 
of whether they thought that such a risk was significant or not.
444
 Lord Judge was less certain 
about whether he would have found in favour of the Foreign Secretary if there had not been 
prior publication of the paragraphs. Although Leigh upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment 
as evidence of a, ‘more sceptical judicial mood’445, he also recognised that the substantive 
decision turned upon its particular facts
446
, and therefore is not perhaps indicative of the 
judiciary’s general approach to intelligence and national security. 
 
In Al Rawi v others, the Supreme Court considered an appeal brought by the executive 
against a decision not to allow a closed material procedure to be conducted in a civil claim 
for tortious damages, where a considerable amount of the evidence was said to be sensitive 
                                                          
442
 Leigh in Born, Leigh and Wills (n 99), 240-241.  
443
 Ibid, paras. 57 (per Lord Judge), 191 (per Lord Neuberger MR), 295 (per Sir Anthony May). 
444
 Ibid, paras. 131, 137, 172 (per Lord Neuberger MR), 290 (per Sir Anthony May). 
445
 Leigh in Born, Leigh and Wills (n 99), 240. 
446
 Ibid, 241. 
104 
Word Count: 40,214 inclusive of abstract and footnotes, excluding bibliography 
intelligence. By this, a procedure was envisaged in which special advocates could be 
appointed to represent a party on the basis of closed material which only the special advocate, 
and where appropriate the court, could see
447
; therefore proceedings in which closed and open 
hearings, considering closed and open evidence, and resulting in closed and open judgments, 
could occur. The court’s judgment did not specifically examine the allegations of complicity 
in detail, but considered rendition only as a background to analysing the potential use of the 
closed material procedure in civil proceedings. Lord Brown, for example, proclaimed that, 
‘claims of the sort made here…ought not simply to be swept under the carpet.’448 By 
confining itself only to consideration of the legal issues involved, and by not participating in 
discussion of the substantive allegations made, it is arguable that the Supreme Court 
somewhat limited the impact of its judgment, in terms of its wider role in overseeing the 
agencies’ actions.  
 
In Al Rawi and others, the government contended that the right to a fair trial, whilst absolute, 
depended upon the particular circumstances, and that therefore the court could order a closed 
material procedure where necessary to achieve a fair trial.
449
 Here, it was asserted that the 
only way by which the executive could properly defend the claim was for the court to order a 
closed material procedure. Generally, in such cases, a balancing exercise is undertaken in the 
form of public interest immunity (PII), in which the potential public injury if disclosure 
occurs must be weighed against the potential harm to the administration of justice if 
                                                          
447
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disclosure is refused.
450
 The difference between PII and the proposed closed material 
procedure is therefore that in the event of the latter, a party to proceedings may have no 
knowledge of the content upon which the relevant claim is brought or defended. They are 
effectively excluded from part of the trial.
451
 The original proceedings in question were 
brought by numerous alleged former victims of extraordinary rendition, with the executive 
estimating that a full PII balancing exercise might be required in respect of as many as 
140,000 documents, meaning that it might take three years to conclude such an exercise 
before beginning substantive proceedings.
452
 The executive’s arguments therefore also rested 
upon the assertion that in this case the PII procedure would be both time consuming and 
resource-heavy. 
 
The court’s majority decision was that it had no power under the common law to order a 
closed material procedure, given that to do so would essentially deviate from the fundamental 
common law rights to natural and open justice.
453
 As discussed above, the consequences of 
the closed material procedure upon a party’s ability to participate in proceedings were seen to 
be too far reaching for the court to implement. If there were to be such developments in the 
future, these should be brought about by Parliament, not the judiciary.
454
 Through this 
judgment, therefore, the Supreme Court once again demonstrated its refusal to simply deviate 
from longstanding common law principles, and defer to the executive, without specific 
justification. The court paid less deference to the executive than the Court of Appeal in 
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Binyam Mohamed (No 2), although this is no doubt attributable to the fact that the subject 
matter of the judgment fitted far more comfortably into the judiciary’s remit. The conduct of 
legal proceedings, and evidential processes, are more obviously within the realm of the 
judiciary’s expertise than matters of national security and political policy. In this way the 
Supreme Court’s decision, when considered alongside that of the Court of Appeal in Binyam 
Mohamed (No 2), perhaps demonstrates a backlash against what may be called the, 
‘legislative creep’455; that is, the trend that once a power is granted by the executive, it 
gradually and stealthily extends its influence within the justice system until it is no longer 
considered as only to be employed in exceptional circumstances.456  
 
However, the Al Rawi judgment demonstrates the difficulty of accommodating intelligence 
issues within the legal system, given that the PII process is demonstrably not the most 
efficient means by which to balance the public interest in disclosing, or alternatively 
restraining evidence. In this case, it would have taken considerable time, money and 
resources to conclude. This may have been a reason why the government decided to settle the 
case before it proceeded further.
457
 Indeed, Lord Brown considered that cases involving 
intelligence are, ‘quite simply untriable by any remotely conventional open court process.’458 
This echoes arguments that the courts are, ‘ill suited as an institution for holding intelligence 
agencies to account’459, which are largely influenced by the need for secrecy and restraint of 
intelligence, and the fact that intelligence general does not attain evidential standards. His 
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Lordship proposed two alternative options; either channelling such cases through an adapted 
judicial mechanism, such as the IPT, or to strike them out as unjusticiable.
460
 Given that there 
is undoubtedly a public interest in such cases, and that the judiciary may only have a role 
within intelligence oversight if they actually consider cases within which matter of 
intelligence are raised, the former would be the preferred option.  
 
The Court of Appeal explicitly considered the relationship between intelligence and 
diplomatic relationships within legal proceedings in R (Al Rawi and others) v Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
461
, in which former detainees and their families 
sought judicial review of the Foreign Secretary’s decision not to make diplomatic 
representations as to the men’s release. The individuals were non-British nationals who were 
resident in the UK, some of whom had refugee status. Although the court proceeded on the 
basis that the men had indeed suffered at least inhuman and degrading treatment
462
, it refused 
to make any specific findings as to alleged wrongdoing.
463
 It found that although the Foreign 
Secretary was empowered to make diplomatic representations, they did not have to in respect 
of non-nationals.
464
 The Court of Appeal’s decision was largely influenced by the fact that 
the proceedings asked it to consider issues related to foreign policy and diplomatic relations, 
which it considered non-justiciable areas.
465
 Although the case also involved questions 
relating to human rights, in the form of the HRA 1998, ECHR and Race Relations Act 1976, 
the court confined its role to ensuring, ‘that the Government…strictly complies with all 
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formal requirements, and rationally considers the matters it has to confront.
466
 Its largely 
unquestioning acceptance of the executive’s arguments relating to the inviolability of foreign 
diplomatic and intelligence relationships led to Leigh criticising the decision for maintaining 
the ‘decidedly ambivalent position of governments supposedly subject to the duty of 
diplomatic protection.’467 It is to be noted, however, that the UK government did 
subsequently make representations to the US regarding the detainees in questions, despite 
their success before the Court of Appeal.
468
 This perhaps demonstrates the importance of 
court proceedings as a means by which Claimants may have their cases publicised, and 
thereby influence executive policy, even if not successful. 
 
The recent use of mediation in order to resolve a claim brought against the UK government 
by former Guantanamo Bay detainees469 is interesting in the context of the judiciary’s role 
within intelligence oversight. It might be viewed as a sign of a forward looking, facilitative 
and collaborative approach to responding to alleged agency misconduct whilst maintaining 
the secrecy of intelligence information. However, it might otherwise be seen as a deliberate 
attempt to prevent details of alleged complicity from entering the public domain. The 
government has characterised the decision to make a settlement as being necessary in order to 
prevent the disclosure of sensitive information, and to save millions of pounds on potential 
court costs; in other words, it made the decision to pursue a private settlement based on its 
regard for protecting national security. Whether this justification is one which has been 
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vindicated is uncertain, given the extent of general information relating to alleged complicity 
which already exists in the public domain.  
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Within the separation of powers framework there will always inevitably be some tension 
between the various branches of the state. This is especially true considering the contrasting 
roles of an executive making political decisions on behalf of its citizens, and the courts 
regulating the propriety and lawfulness of actions pursued in the name of security. However, 
it is essential to emphasise that, ‘civil liberties and national security are not at odds with each 
other but…human rights and fundamental freedoms contribute to security – especially if one 
takes the position that security means the protection of the fundamental values of a society 
against any possible threat.’470 This must act as a guiding principle to both the executive and 
judiciary within the context of judicial decision-making in cases involving intelligence issues. 
Although the branches of state perform very specific roles based on various different 
objectives, each must act as robustly as possible, within their particular remit, in order to 
balanced and effective intelligence oversight. To this end, the judiciary must accept their duty 
in, ‘stimulating and invigorating responsible government’471, given that by doing so, they 
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enable other critical elements of the state and society to protest against executive measures in 
an informed manner.472  
 
Aldrich asserts that, ‘intelligence exchange between these organizations is a world within a 
world, governed by its own diplomacy and characterized by elaborate agreements, 
understandings and treaties.’473 The practice of extraordinary rendition is itself typified by an 
overlapping of foreign affairs, intelligence liaisons and the law, especially given states’ use of 
intelligence cooperation as a means of, ‘assuring security’474 by justifying restraint upon the 
disclosure of sensitive information. Given this, it is inevitable that the courts will face 
difficulties in accommodating analysis of intelligence and foreign liaisons within the legal 
process. This is especially so where it is asserted that a legal judgment may affect the 
relationship between states, as was the government’s contention in Mohamed (No 2). The 
decisions of both the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court indicate that within the intelligence 
oversight framework, the balance of power falls both to the legislature and especially the 
executive for such reasons. Although the judiciary has asserted its constitutional role of 
scrutiny
475
, in reality it is likely to defer to the executive in matters which have traditionally 
been non-justiciable. This means that in practice the judiciary generally do not oversee the 
agencies’ actions to any great extent, and appear to be the least effective branch of the 
intelligence oversight framework, despite the fact that they exist to uphold the rule of law and 
individuals’ rights.  For these reasons, it is submitted that although recent examples of 
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judicial activism are encouraging, the traditional legal process is not generally a suitable 
means by which complaints about the agencies may be sufficiently scrutinised. A body which 
has the expertise and confidence to properly scrutinise sensitive intelligence would more 
appropriately hold the agencies to account, and uphold the judicial role within intelligence 
oversight. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF NON-TRADITIONAL OVERSIGHT BODIES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Although this thesis has examined the existing state institutions which oversee the UK 
intelligence and security agencies, the globalisation of intelligence has created an expanding 
role for non-state organisations acting on behalf of society as a whole, and providing an 
external means by which citizens may mobilise to raise concerns about intelligence agencies’ 
activites.
476
 The phrase “civil society” refers to bodies who are formed by, led by, or work 
for, the public; newspapers and investigative journalists, charities and Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) therefore all categorise as Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). 
Although transnational organisations also have an increasingly important role in intelligence 
oversight they are inter-governmental in nature and therefore do not fit easily into the CSO 
category. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter they will instead be considered as “non-
traditional oversight bodies”. Given the public aspect of their work, CSOs are a 
democratically legitimate means by which to ensure that the executive and agencies are 
questioned and held to account over alleged wrongdoing. Their work often specifically 
focuses upon the law as a means by which to promote change, which is important given the 
inherent propensity of intelligence to affect citizens’ individual rights and liberties. 
 
In recent years non-traditional oversight bodies have driven the public debate concerning the 
allegations of UK agencies’ complicity in extraordinary rendition, through their 
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investigations, reports, and involvement in related law suits. Furthermore, sustained calls for 
a public inquiry have stemmed largely from such bodies, and have focused upon the means 
by which to ensure that such proceedings are as transparent as possible; revelations as to the 
remit and procedure of the Gibson inquiry led to certain NGOs refusing to participate in it. 
Such activism demonstrates the wider role of civil society in promoting transparency and 
good governance.
477
 It is, however, important to note that there are limitations to such bodies’ 
involvement within intelligence oversight. They represent a relatively unexplored form of 
oversight which does not fit within the separation of powers model and therefore may 
obstruct the functioning of existing state oversight institutions. Furthermore the inherent 
secrecy of intelligence means that the accuracy and authority of the work completed by non-
traditional oversight bodies may suffer from the limited material to which they have access.  
 
This chapter will examine the role which civil society in general may play within intelligence 
oversight, analysing the advantages and limitations of such an approach, before considering 
the role of the three most prominent type of bodies falling within the “non-traditional” 
category; NGOs, the Press, and transnational bodies. It will analyse their individual 
contribution to the oversight of the agencies in relation to the complicity allegations, before 
examining how they fit within the existing intelligence oversight framework, in terms of how 
such bodies interact and strike a balance with the respective state oversight institutions. 
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6.2 Civil Society and Intelligence Oversight 
 
Although it has been argued that, ‘[c]ivil society is now frequently equated with a distrust of 
the state’478, in order for criticism to be constructive and not merely opportunistic, it should 
be provoked only if there is a valid perception that the State has acted wrongly. Distrust of 
CSOs’ involvement in the intelligence process comes from the fact that it promotes 
transparency of process, and therefore requires openness on the part of the agencies, and 
other actors, in order to be meaningful. In the area of intelligence, which has previously 
operated on the basis that the less is publicly known about the agencies, the more secure the 
state will be, it is understandable that the agencies might not immediately embrace the 
concept of criticism for constructive, and not destructive, purposes.
479
 However, if the state is 
to actively recognise that, ‘[d]emocracy is founded on every citizen’s right to take part in the 
management of public affairs’480, then it must welcome CSOs and non-traditional oversight 
bodies within the existing oversight framework, and thus allow citizens to more easily 
participate within the democratic process.
481
  
 
The relationship between CSOs and the executive is delicately balanced; the overriding goal 
of the former, within oversight, is to, ‘function as a force for accountability, pressurising 
officials to inform the public about what they are doing and explain their decisions, and 
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holding them responsible for what they have done.’482 The latter’s priority is to protect the 
intelligence process, and agencies’ operations, by seeking to control publication of sensitive 
material. As acknowledged above, it is inevitable that CSOs will criticise both the 
intelligence agencies and the government, else there would be little reason for their existence. 
However, in order to successfully cooperate with the executive, CSOs must act responsibly 
and base their conclusions upon sound research rather than mere conjecture.
483
 This could 
especially be a concern regarding CSOs with particularly obvious agendas, and media bodies 
who, as commercial entities, might seek to profit from sensationalizing stories. Therefore, a 
possible advantage of incorporating the role of transnational bodies within intelligence 
oversight is that they are created by state cooperation, and thus may be perceived as more 
legitimate forms of oversight.  
 
As a parallel commitment ensuring effective cooperation, the executive itself must also 
encourage the involvement of non-traditional oversight bodies within intelligence oversight. 
The ISC has begun to do so, through consulting CSO reports, and questioning representatives 
from CSOs in order to produce ‘Rendition’.484 In ‘Rendition’, the ISC noted the contribution 
of such bodies, acknowledged the concerns they raise, and addressed them during the course 
of the report. However, the Committee rejected such concerns, which included the Council of 
Europe’s criticisms of the UK government’s handling of the Diego Garcia allegations,485 the 
European Parliament’s allegations regarding the treatment of Binyam Mohamed and Martin 
                                                          
482
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Mubanga,
486
 and Reprieve’s evidence regarding Mohamed, Bisher al Rawi and Jamil el-
Banna.
487
 It is encouraging that the ISC overtly acknowledged the work of a variety of 
oversight bodies, although the rejection of many of their conclusions, with seemingly little 
analysis of the facts, suggests that the substantive contribution of such bodies to ‘Rendition’ 
was not significant.   
 
The government’s announcement of the terms of the Gibson inquiry into allegations of 
agency complicity outlined that much of the process would take place in secret, with limited 
access for affected individuals. This suggested that the inquiry would not be sufficiently 
transparent as would be necessary in order to be authoritative and to facilitate CSO 
involvement. Indeed, in response to these announcements, several influential NGOs distanced 
themselves from the inquiry.
488
 Given that initial celebrations of the inquiry viewed it as 
increasing transparency within intelligence, it is tempting to view such developments as 
limiting the inquiry’s impact. However, this would ignore the fact that certain material may 
be too sensitive to publish, and that the inquiry must investigate fully the allegations whilst 
respecting the agencies’ operational capacity. Given such competing demands, it is debatable 
whether the boycott of the Gibson inquiry was necessary, or whether consultation could have 
occurred within the terms of the inquiry. Again, although the Gibson inquiry is no longer 
taking place as planned, it will now fully report back to the executive as to its findings before 
being wound down. 
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As purely external bodies, CSOs and transnational organisations do not have access to the, 
‘sensitive and difficult’489 intelligence upon which the agencies’ work is based, which is turn 
creates the possibility that their work might fail to give sufficient weight to national security 
considerations. Caparini notes that the discretionary operational authority awarded to agents, 
and the doctrine of plausible deniability, contribute in creating an environment where much 
information is unknown, or restricted to certain few individuals.
490
 This makes it difficult for 
non-traditional oversight bodies to gain knowledge of the intelligence process, especially 
since its inherent secrecy means that few, ‘possess the technical expertise’491 necessary to 
contextualise their criticisms. They may not fully comprehend the agencies’ operational 
difficulties, and the challenge of international intelligence cooperation; in consequence, the 
intervention and constant campaigning of CSOs on intelligence-related issues may frustrate 
the agencies’ ability to act. The ability of CSOs to access useful, or restricted information, is 
enhanced by whether such bodies boast extensive resources; for example, Reprieve, a well-
known NGO working in the area of rendition, has teams dedicated to investigating UK 
complicity in torture, and to cases involving Guantanamo Bay detainees. The expertise of 
such bodies complements the official policy-making process, ‘since it gives policy-makers 
and legislators access to information that is credible but independent.’492 Without using 
excessive state resources, the subsequent reports add to general public discourse in an area 
which has not always been so publicly accessible.  
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It is arguable that the emergence of ‘intelligence governance actors at the international 
level’493 is related to globalisation, which has facilitated cooperation between national and 
international organisations.
494
 This has allowed certain bodies, such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch, for example, to expand their membership and remit to a global 
scale. In this way, they may increase their influence upon the policy-making process and 
uphold legal norms to which states subscribe at both national and international level.
495
 The 
international dimension to their work has encouraged CSOs to ensure the protection of 
human rights within the intelligence process, which otherwise may be forgotten by state 
oversight institutions. The ISC, for example, focuses upon effectiveness, rather than 
propriety
496
, meaning that the contribution of CSOs may supplement the Committee’s work 
through their focus upon individual rights. CSOs have extensively publicised states’ 
obligations under the Convention Against Torture 1984, the European Convention on Human 
Rights, International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the Geneva Conventions, 
amongst others. Through reinforcing the work of national CSOs, their international 
counterparts have, ‘functioned in effect as a sort of remote accountability mechanism at the 
local level’497 in both a presentational and legal sense; states are reminded that their 
accountability and responsibilities are owed at an international level, and that they are 
potentially legally liable for any wrongdoing in multiple jurisdictions.  
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Given that civil society is an external, and relatively new, form of oversight, it, ‘lacks the 
legitimacy of elected bodies’498; in consequence, the authority of CSOs’ work can vary 
considerably. If such bodies wish to make a meaningful contribution to intelligence oversight, 
they must themselves ensure to be as transparent and independent as possible.
499
 Inevitably, 
such bodies investigate and report on such issues because they have a certain interest in them, 
which can affect the tone of their work. The overly-emotive tone of Reprieve’s reports, for 
example, detracts from the time and resources evidently invested in them, and the 
conclusions thus reached.
500
 Although rendition is inevitably an emotive issue, an overtly 
critical approach undermines the possibility of extensive cooperation between CSOs and the 
executive. In contrast, reports written with a more balanced, objective tone, backed up with 
extensive and solid evidence, might facilitate greater understanding between the two forms of 
intelligence oversight. 
 
 
6.3 The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations   
 
Although Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) do not fit within the separation of 
powers model of intelligence oversight, they provide a complementary role to the three 
branches of state, through providing external checks on their actions, decisions and reports, 
and thereby encouraging widespread transparency of process. However, through their non-
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partisan nature, the contribution of NGOs to intelligence oversight may not always be 
sufficiently objective to constitute meaningful oversight of the intelligence agencies. This 
section will analyse the role of NGOs in specific relation to how such bodies responded to the 
allegations of complicity in extraordinary rendition, in order to consider the means by which 
the contribution of NGOs may be facilitated in intelligence oversight. 
 
In terms of the allegations surrounding UK complicity in the US “renditions cycle”, the 
contribution of NGOs has been especially useful in an investigatory capacity. This has been 
due to the extensive research involved in producing their reports, through undertaking legal 
analysis, interviewing former detainees, and commissioning investigators around the world to 
help construct a coherent picture of every aspect of the “rendition cycle”. Reprieve, for 
example, traced the movements of the planes involved in the alleged rendition on Binyam 
Mohamed, in order link such aircraft to the actions of the intelligence personnel it says were 
involved in his rendition.
501
 Through subsequently publicising the results of such research, 
these NGOs have mobilised the international community, as demonstrated by a plethora of 
campaigns and reports by international transnational bodies, such as the Council of Europe 
and Venice Commission.
502
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502
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The contribution of NGOs to the rendition allegations has also promoted greater transparency 
within the UK agencies, and the intelligence process as a whole. For example, early calls for 
an inquiry into allegations of agency complicity largely focused upon the means by which to 
ensure the authority of such an inquiry, in terms of it being, ‘prompt…independent… 
thorough…[and] subject to public scrutiny.’503 The credibility of an independent inquiry rests 
largely upon NGOs and interested bodies being able to participate in a meaningful way
504
 and 
therefore the announcement of the Gibson inquiry appeared to demonstrate the executive’s 
willingness to commission a transparent inquiry. However, the published Protocol preserved 
a certain margin of discretion as to the use of sensitive material, and restricted the persons 
who can be present during its sessions
505
; the resulting boycott by certain major NGOs 
demonstrated that the Inquiry lacked perceived legitimacy and transparency.
506
 It is 
disappointing that bodies with global influence distanced themselves from the inquiry, since 
this detracted from its legitimacy. Co-operation between the executive and civil society rests 
upon both factions acknowledging the competing arguments of secrecy and public knowledge 
of security affairs. 
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NGOs may contribute in the legislative process through lobbying and consultation, giving 
evidence to parliamentary committees, and by analysing their reports. Gill argues that this is 
especially important given that such bodies, ‘can produce highly relevant knowledge even in 
the uncompromising context of highly secret intelligence collaboration.’507 Furthermore, they 
may constructively criticise the UK agencies in an external capacity, without any political 
consequences,
508
 which could otherwise be a pressing concern for the parliamentary branch 
of oversight. Leigh notes that in order to be meaningful, NGO participation in the policy-
making process must occur sufficiently early in order to influence state institutions, namely 
Parliament.
509
 With regards to rendition, it is doubtful that the contribution of NGOs and 
interested bodies occurred at such an early stage, and consequently, their reports have largely 
been overly retrospective rather than focusing on future recommended policy changes. 
However, given the secrecy surrounding intelligence affairs, and the slow release of 
information relating to rendition, this has been largely inevitable.  
 
Although the contribution of NGOs to intelligence oversight has the potential to be a positive 
development, there is a, ‘risk that powerful, well-connected or well-funded groups can have 
disproportionate influence.’510 Reprieve, Redress, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, amongst others, hold a particularly strong position of expertise regarding 
rendition, thus allowing them to, ‘speak on more than equal terms with governments and 
                                                          
507
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international organisations.’511 However, this somewhat limits the opportunity for pluralism 
which underpins the contribution of civil society to intelligence oversight, given that only 
bodies with sufficient resources and previous experience will realistically have a voice. The 
list of ‘Non Government Witnesses’ consulted by the ISC in ‘Rendition’, for example, only 
includes Amnesty International and Liberty, although the Committee considered the reports, 
and written submissions, of certain other bodies.
512
  
 
Although certain NGOs may be particularly influential, they have not been immune to the 
risk of bias. The objectivity of Amnesty International, for example, was disputed as a result 
of its association with Moazzam Begg, a former detainee at Guantanamo Bay, who was later 
associated with the controversial group “Cageprisoners”.513 Similarly, although Reprieve is a 
well-known NGO on matters relating to torture and rendition, its reports often appear to be 
partisan; its definition of extraordinary rendition, for example, rests on the assertion that, 
‘“rendition” is actually a synonym for “kidnapping.”’514 However, generally, NGOs’ reports 
have demonstrated a critical approach to the ISC’s reports. Redress, for example, has been 
sceptical about the conclusions reached in ‘Rendition’, noting that, ‘[t]he UK litigation has 
since revealed a great deal more than emerged from the ISC report.’515 Similarly, Amnesty 
International has disputed that the ISC’s report was independent and transparent516, pointing 
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to the fact that the 2008 High Court judgement, ‘confirmed what had long been suspected – 
that the ISC failed to turn up large amounts of evidence which was highly relevant to Binyam 
Mohamed’s case.’517 Such criticisms relate both to the ISC’s structure and the substantive 
conclusions reached in ‘Rendition’, therefore calling into question the extent to which 
consulted NGOs contributed to the report, and whether their involvement was merely 
presentational.
518
 This latter suggestion is perhaps strengthened by the fact that although the 
ISC acknowledged the work of NGOs in helping to frame the terms of ‘Rendition’, the extent 
of their contribution is not apparent from the report’s substantive content.  
 
The role of NGOs within intelligence oversight also extends to upholding and complementing 
the judicial function of oversight by driving litigation through the courts. NGOs working in 
this capacity have two purposes; firstly, asserting the specific rights and liberties of the 
individual in question and secondly, using their example to campaign for changes to 
policy.
519
 The first of these objectives is particularly important, given that the wrongdoing 
alleged against the UK agencies was primarily committed against individuals. Therefore, 
although evidence relating to a CIA-led “renditions cycle” focuses attention upon the “bigger 
picture” of potential widespread complicity, those directly affected must have first recourse 
to the courts. NGOs may assist such individuals, who may not have the means or expertise 
themselves, to bring an action themselves before the courts.
520
 Reprieve explicitly states that 
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its purpose is to, ‘[use] the law to enforce the human rights of prisoners…’521, and has 
assisted in the preparation of numerous individuals’ rendition claims. Similarly, counsel 
instructed by JUSTICE and Liberty have made submissions in a case involving numerous 
former detainees, and that of Binyam Mohamed, before both the Court of Appeal
522
 and the 
Supreme Court.
523
 
 
The second strand of NGO involvement within the legal system uses court cases as a means 
by which to highlight overall alleged agency wrongdoing, in order to seek policy change. By 
channelling their complaints through the legal channels in this way, NGOs are also able to 
test them in a court of law, and according to the rule of law, rather than circulating 
unsubstantiated theories; pursuing complaints in legal form, ‘invests them with added 
legitimacy and helps to enlist a wider range of support behind campaigns to remedy 
injustice.’524 An application for judicial review brought by the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC), for example, challenges the recent guidelines on the handling of 
detainees by UK agencies
525
 on the basis that they are inconsistent with both national and 
international law, through giving officers an expectation that they are not liable for situations 
where they are aware of a “serious risk of torture” but interview the detainee, relying on 
caveats or ministerial authority to do so.
526
 By bringing this action, the EHRC have drawn 
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public attention to the potential deficiencies of the guidance, by relating it to a substantive 
cause of action.   
 
However, it is otherwise arguable that whilst upholding the judicial function by channelling 
their complaints through the courts in this way, NGOs may obstruct the functioning of other 
oversight institutions. This has been particularly evident throughout the Binyam Mohamed 
litigation, where Mohamed’s complaints were supported and publicised by numerous NGOs, 
especially JUSTICE and Liberty, who made written submissions as interested parties in both 
the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. As a result, the finding of the Court of Appeal that 
certain paragraphs relating to the treatment of Mohamed could be published
527
, and 
subsequent publication of Lord Neuberger’s criticism of the agencies, was alternatively 
celebrated as a triumph of justice for civil society
528
, and as disappointing for the 
executive.
529
 Although oversight must be looked at in a holistic way, in terms of how the 
individual institutions work together, such instances demonstrate that the role of civil society 
may be viewed as alternatively positive or negative, depending upon whose opinion one is 
considering. As ever, the correct balance between oversight institutions is near impossible to 
achieve, but must rely upon increased trust and cooperation in order to further the mutual 
goals of increased transparency of process ensuring more effective intelligence.  
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6.4 The Role of Transnational Organisations 
 
Transnational bodies such as the Council of Europe, Venice Commission and UN Human 
Rights Committee have also played a significant role in uncovering and interpreting the 
alleged complicity of various states, including the UK, in relation to the practice of 
extraordinary rendition. It is perhaps useful to consider such bodies as somewhat 
representative of international civil society, although they hold a unique place within 
intelligence oversight; transnational organisations are not non-governmental, given that their 
existence comes about through the consent of states as members. However, the multi-state 
membership, and global agenda of such bodies means that they are able to consider issues on 
a relatively critical level, as evidenced by reports such as those by the UN Special 
Rapporteur, and by the UN Human Rights Council, which have been highly critical of the 
UK’s role within rendition.530 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) have both made significant contributions to intelligence oversight. Cases brought 
before the ECtHR include Malone v UK and Harman & Hewitt v UK, which paved the way 
for a, ‘regulatory revolution’531 in the form of domestic intelligence oversight legislation. At 
the same time, ECHR provisions have ensured the prominence of the concepts of 
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proportionality and necessity within domestic courts when considering intrusion by state 
agencies.
532
 However, Cameron notes that the contribution of the ECtHR to intelligence 
oversight is somewhat limited by the fact that, as an incidental form of review, it can only 
consider intelligence oversight as and when it arises indirectly before the court.
533
 In turn, the 
ECtHR cannot be part of a holistic oversight system, but is tightly bound by its procedural 
rules, therefore limiting its overall contribution to the UK system, which relies upon a series 
of flexible checks and balances by various institutions.
534
  
 
The involvement of transnational bodies within intelligence oversight generally lends the 
discussion concerning rendition and torture greater credibility, and global censure to any 
criticism, given that these are bodies to which multiple states belong and contribute. The 
international dimension of their work similarly means that the consequences of negative 
reports are more widespread than in a domestic context, especially given that ‘[h]aving a 
reputation for good intelligence is a factor in national diplomatic weight abroad.’535 The 
anticipatory effect of transnational bodies’ contribution to intelligence oversight therefore 
may to some extent encourage states to take their responsibilities, in terms of transparency 
and accountability, more seriously. In this way, although such bodies have not been able to 
enforce formal sanctions against states,
536
 through the publication of their reports they have 
demonstrated, ‘an ability to generate pan-European awareness about the issues of rendition 
and secret detention.’537  
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Transnational bodies face the same difficulties as national bodies with regards to their access 
to intelligence and information, with Born and Wills observing that inquiries by both the 
European Parliament and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe were, 
‘consistently stonewalled by many European governments.’538 However, such bodies have 
greater investigatory capacities than domestic bodies, given their extensive resources, and the 
numbers of state members which may contribute to any research. The multi-jurisdictional 
nature of rendition has facilitated the involvement of transnational bodies in investigating, 
and piecing together, multi-state involvement in the practice. Similarly, the fact that such 
bodies operate on a global level means that they have more informed international legal 
expertise, which lends greater authority to their reports.  The Council of Europe reports into 
secret detention, for example, provide a, ‘graphic account of the rendition process’539, and 
have contributed greatly to subsequent investigations, whilst a Venice Commission report 
into the law relating to rendition flights has similarly informed the debate on the matter.
540
  
 
However, the very fact that such bodies are transnational alternately means that their 
contribution to the UK intelligence oversight framework is not comprehensive; their reports 
identify general instances of wrongdoing across member states, and consider issues of 
international rather than domestic law. The conclusions of transnational bodies are therefore 
either not state-specific, or, if they are, are not sufficiently informed about UK intelligence 
oversight to make specific suggestions for reform. In terms of their treatment of transnational 
intelligence cooperation, as Gill notes, ‘the problem is much clearer than the solution’541; it is 
evident that cooperation is both necessary and welcome, but the means by which to formalise 
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such agreements whilst maintaining the secrecy of cooperation liaisons, as necessary for 
reasons of foreign policy and diplomacy, is rather more difficult.
542
 For such reasons, it 
appears that the contribution of transnational bodies to remedying any “accountability gaps” 
will be most significant if incorporated within, ‘a pluralistic accountability structure’543 
comprising of national and international bodies. 
 
 
6.5 The Press
544
 
 
Given that the Press is, ‘the main means by which the population is informed about the 
actions of government’545, it inhabits a position of relative power regarding the dissemination 
of news relating to the UK intelligence and security agencies, and matters of national 
importance.
546
 This is strengthened by media bodies’ financial resources, investigative ability 
and access to a diverse international audience.
547
 Traditionally, the role of the press in 
reporting intelligence matters was constrained by the fact that, ‘[i]ntelligence was the last 
taboo of British politics…protected from public gaze and parliamentary scrutiny.’548 
However, in recent years enhanced cooperation between the UK agencies and the Press has 
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attempted to, ‘‘blow away’ myths about the Service.’549 This section will therefore look at the 
means by which the Press may contribute to intelligence oversight, and has done so in 
response to the allegations of UK complicity in extraordinary rendition. 
 
Within the limits of the inherent secrecy of intelligence, and need to protect operational 
details, the Press contributes to intelligence oversight through publishing matters of public 
interest; without the publication of such articles, even less would be known about 
intelligence, leading to a less informed and critical citizenry, and a greater propensity for 
agency wrongdoing to go unchallenged. In recent years, there has been increasing judicial 
recognition of the Press’s right to publish matters of public interest, due in part to the 
entrenched right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. In Observer and The 
Guardian v UK
550
, relating to the UK Spycatcher litigation, the ECtHR recognised that the 
media, ‘has a legitimate interest in reporting on and drawing the public's attention to 
deficiencies in the operation of Government services, including possible illegal activities.’551 
The role of the Press is therefore seen to enhance transparency. Within the existing oversight 
framework, this means that Parliament’s activities, and reports, are publicised, that the 
executive is held to account where necessary, and that the judiciary’s role is upheld through 
the reporting of court cases involving intelligence. At its most effective, the Press may thus 
function as, ‘an essential cog in the mechanism of responsible governance.’552  
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Investigative journalism, especially, may contribute meaningfully to intelligence oversight, 
given that it relies upon extensive preparation which ensures that the journalists involved are 
well equipped to understand, and explain in more accessible terms, certain aspects of the 
technical intelligence process.
553
 Their expertise makes them perfectly placed to know, 
‘which questions to ask…[and] whom to approach.’554 Stephen Grey, especially, has done 
important investigative work on the subject of rendition flights; his book, Ghost Plane, for 
example, was the result of time-consuming research into tracing and linking the use of 
particular airplanes in order to construct an overall picture of the US-led programme.
555
 
Certain newspapers have journalists dedicated solely to matters of intelligence; most notable, 
perhaps, are Ian Cobain and Richard Norton-Taylor of The Guardian, although free-lance 
journalists such as Stephen Grey and Dana Priest have also contributed valuably to 
discussions about extraordinary rendition. The existence of dedicated intelligence journalists 
therefore allows for papers to build up a wealth of expertise and report consistently upon 
intelligence affairs. Such individuals’ relative expertise in the realm of intelligence also 
promotes trust from both the UK agencies and representatives from the other branches of 
intelligence oversight.  
 
In order to ensure that they report matters of intelligence responsibly, media bodies must 
have, as far as is possible, access to information; the alternative might lead to sensationalized 
and inaccurate reporting which fails to contextualise the issues reported upon.
556
 In a 
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globalised world which relies upon the constant, and international, dissemination of news
557
, 
it is difficult for governments to, ‘conceal news from their populations.’558 With regards to 
intelligence especially, the desire, and pressure, to seek exclusive leading stories could lead to 
the publication of unsecure information, which might, in turn, jeopardise sources or 
operations. This is an especially pressing concern given that media bodies are essentially 
commercial entities which report stories in order to sell newspaper copies; in turn, this means 
that media bodies are not impartial and seek, through their choice of stories and reporting of 
incidents, to promote a certain agenda, however subtly or unconsciously.
559
  
 
In order to produce informed reports, journalists must also have good working relationships 
with the UK intelligence agencies, perhaps through the form of regular security briefings and 
general training about operational difficulties. Formal press enquiries are handled by 
government departments, and, theoretically, only certain senior officials may have contact 
with the media.
560
 However, previously, some government ministers have briefed favoured 
journalists about intelligence developments seeking to influence subsequent media reports.
561
 
However, the Press must be free from political pressures or the threat of censorship, as far as 
is practicable, in order for it to operate as an alternate and complementary form of 
intelligence oversight.
562
 In this sense, Lustgarten and Leigh argue that the commercial power 
of media bodies can be considered an advantage in the face of governmental opposition, since 
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they possess, ‘the political and economic power to face down legal threats and to fight actions 
resolutely if they do occur.’563  
 
Informal relationships between journalists and agency officials have previously allowed both 
sides to benefit from media publicity whilst ensuring the effective protection of sources.
564
 
However, the agents concerned tend to be either “rogue” agents, or internal whistleblowers, 
which are unorthodox avenues by which to discover information, and may not yield 
sufficiently objective information. Agents may leak information for their own personal 
gain
565
, and so journalists must be vigilant about verifying such information, especially where 
extensive “damage” is done by the revelations, in terms of compromising the identity of 
sources, or the success of a planned operation.
566
  
 
The Press must also negotiate the legal framework which regulates the publication of 
sensitive information, in order to report responsibly and accurately. This affects its 
relationship with the judicial branch of the state, given that procedural court restrictions such 
as public interest immunity (PII), closed material and special advocate procedures restrict 
what information they may publish about cases involving the intelligence agencies. A recent 
Supreme Court decision in Al Rawi and others v Security Service
567
 upheld the Court of 
Appeal’s finding that the court had no inherent common law jurisdiction to order a closed 
material procedure in a civil claim for damages brought by former Guantanamo Bay 
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detainees against MI5. The Guardian, the BBC and The Times appeared as second 
interveners in the case, in both courts, seeking to uphold the principle of open justice, which 
was found to extend beyond individuals to the public at large.
568
 If the courts had found 
otherwise, the ability of the media to report information in such matters would have been 
severely constrained.  
 
Given the necessity for open justice to be preserved, in relation to the media’s ability to 
publish articles relating to intelligence, certain sections of the media have actively pursued 
openness within the legal system, in relation to rendition. In the Binyam Mohamed litigation, 
The Guardian and The Times, as interested parties, argued that certain paragraphs relating to 
Mohamed’s treatment should be made public as part of the court’s judgement. Their 
submissions were founded upon the rights of the media to report matters of public interest 
under Art 10 ECHR, and court judgements under Art 6 ECHR.
569
 In the Court of Appeal 
judgement, Judge LCJ expanded upon the principle of open justice in as far as it includes the 
role of the media.
570
 Much of his comments have been covered in this chapter; that open 
justice requirement encompasses the media’s ability to scrutinise the judicial process571, 
contribute to democratic accountability
572
 and report independently of outside influence.
573
 
However, of particular interest are his observations that the ability of the Press to report on 
intelligence is in no way constrained by the investigations of other bodies, such as the ISC.
574
 
This reinforces that the relationship between the media and the ISC, within the intelligence 
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oversight framework, may be complementary and mutually reinforcing rather than 
necessarily antagonistic. It is encouraging to observe media bodies acting as interested bodies 
in court cases, given that this demonstrates their interest in upholding the free press and right 
to report, whilst also respecting the rule of law and the supremacy of the judiciary in such a 
forum. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that, although a less traditional form of oversight, civil society 
has a definite and expanding role within intelligence oversight, and may complement the 
functioning of existing state institutions.
575
 These existing branches of oversight must 
welcome the contribution of non-traditional oversight bodies as necessary in ensuring greater 
transparency and accountability, whilst CSOs and transnational organisations must 
themselves be objective in their consideration of intelligence-related issues, and prepared to 
recognise their technical limitations. Through increasing the involvement of non-traditional 
bodies within intelligence, Gibson states that the resulting change in the intelligence 
hierarchy, ‘may be the key to the delivery of balanced assessments.’576 
 
The investigatory capacity of NGOs has been very important in contributing to the discussion 
surrounding the allegations of complicity, although in the future the ISC must ensure that its 
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consultation with NGOs is meaningful and not merely presentational. Similarly, although the 
Gibson inquiry appeared to be a positive development in terms of the executive 
acknowledging NGOs’ campaigns, the subsequent boycott of the inquiry was disappointing. 
Although the inquiry has been wound down, it remains to be seen what impact any NGO 
collaboration had on its investigations and findings. Rather than merely criticising the 
agencies and the executive, NGOs might be welcomed by such actors if they devised 
practical solutions to the problems they perceive to exist. However, it has been encouraging 
to observe NGOs using the legal system as a means by which to uphold the rights of the 
individual, and to add legal weight to their criticisms of the agencies’ policies in general. 
 
The role of transnational bodies within intelligence oversight comes with limitations; 
although the global level at which such bodies operate lends its reports greater credibility and 
censure, its criticism can never be state specific, and it subsequently offers little in the way of 
national solutions. However, the increasing involvement of such bodies is testament to the 
fact that, ‘[t]he level of interest, comment and scrutiny [in the agencies’ actions] is 
relentless… and growing’577, and that the consequences of any wrongdoing will be felt at 
both national and international level.  
 
Finally, the Press has been shown to be crucial in investigating and disseminating 
intelligence-related material to the public, and thereby providing another means by which to 
scrutinise the state. It is true that there are possible limitations to the contribution of media 
bodies, by reasons of their potential bias, inaccuracy, and the lack of journalists’ technical 
expertise. However, providing that there is sustained competition between various media 
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outlets, the chances of the public being exposed to biased information is lessened.
578
 
Furthermore, the fundamental position that the Press holds in relation to the principle of open 
justice has been unequivocally upheld by both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, 
thus proving the desire for, ‘a vigorous, probing, and critical Press.’579 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has sought to analyse how the existing UK intelligence oversight mechanisms 
have responded to the allegations of the intelligence and security services’ complicity in 
extraordinary rendition. These allegations have provided the biggest challenge to the agencies 
in modern times, and this thesis has therefore treated them as foundations from which to 
consider broader questions relating to the effectiveness, powers and limitations of the existing 
oversight mechanisms. This method of analysis has been adopted because the way in which 
states have responded to, and engaged with, the allegations signifies their attitude towards 
accommodating accountability and transparency of process more generally within the 
intelligence machinery. Although the inherent secrecy of intelligence necessitates a more 
nuanced approach to oversight than would be the case with other public organisations, it does 
not provide a justification for failing to address or, ‘covering up mismanagement, failure or 
corruption.’580 
 
It has been necessary to approach the issue of intelligence oversight from an understanding of 
the legal principles and legislation underpinning the existing framework, since these provide 
a starting point from which oversight and accountability can take place, and become 
meaningful.
581
 Furthermore, the multi-jurisdictional nature of extraordinary rendition means 
that an understanding of international law is required in order to bring UK intelligence 
oversight up to date with the consequences of increasing cooperation between foreign 
agencies. Since the events of 9/11, the agencies’ move from, ‘mere ‘finding’ towards more 
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‘fixing’ and ‘enforcing’’582 has been accompanied by a parallel expansion in international 
intelligence cooperation. Collectively, these factors somewhat explain why the existing 
legislative framework does not specifically provide guidance for the agencies’ expanding 
activities and responsibilities, especially concerning the treatment and detention of detainees.  
 
Having established the context within which a debate about intelligence oversight is situated, 
this thesis then analysed the bodies which currently oversee the agencies’ actions, both in 
terms of their powers, and how they specifically responded to and engaged with the 
allegations of complicity. The strength of an oversight framework modelled on the separation 
of powers is that the branches of state have complementary roles and therefore, when 
operating concurrently, their collective strengths, ‘may mitigate their individual 
weaknesses.’583 However, this rests upon the assumption that all the branches of state work 
collaboratively and have sufficient powers to exercise effective oversight. At present the 
balance of power firmly lies with the executive, due to their control over foreign affairs, 
national security and disclosure of sensitive information. In turn, this leads to “accountability 
gaps” in respect of the UK agencies’ activities, such as their liaisons with other foreign 
intelligence and security agencies.
584
 
 
The key to ensuring a more balanced relationship between the UK oversight bodies rests 
upon the legislation which established their roles and powers; the Security Service Act 1988 
and the Intelligence Service Act 1994. Currently this legislation fails to cater for the ISC’s 
experience and knowledge of intelligence, whilst allowing too much deference to the 
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executive. It is therefore encouraging that the ISC has advocated changes to the legislation, 
including that it have both a formal remit to consider the agencies’ operational activities, and 
the power to require information to be provided.
585
 Any developments implemented will 
assist in entrenching the perception that the ISC is capable of providing a secure arena within 
which the UK intelligence and security services’ actions may be scrutinised. However, the 
effectiveness of any legislative changes rests upon a relationship of mutual trust between the 
branches of the state, including a recognition that it is in the interests of the state, the agencies 
and the oversight bodies themselves that they work collaboratively; ‘oversight is a process, 
not an event.’586 
 
It has been said that, ‘if there are no enforcement measures for accountability, there is no 
democracy.’587 The judiciary provides a means of ex post facto and incidental review, and a 
means by which judgments against the agencies may be given and enforced, although 
relatively few legal actions have been brought to date. However the executive’s traditional 
margin of discretion concerning national security has somewhat hindered the judiciary’s 
ability to act as a free, informed and independent source of oversight to date. This has been 
exacerbated by existing evidential protections for intelligence, in the form of public interest 
immunity and closed evidence procedures. It is unarguable that some redaction of truly 
sensitive information is necessary to accommodate intelligence within the legal system, 
preferably carried out by an expert tribunal. However the process by which such a balancing 
exercise is carried out should be sufficiently transparent. This is especially the case given the 
outcome of the decision in Mohamed (No 2), in which intelligence held by the executive to be 
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sensitive was found not to be so by the Court of Appeal, who subsequently published it. A 
system in which an individual may not access intelligence which they seek to rely upon to 
either uphold or defend a legal complaint frustrates the concept of an open and public legal 
system.  
 
A government Green Paper which considered the use of secret evidence within court 
proceedings was published in October 2011 and more recently finished its consultation 
process.
588
 Although it has not been discussed in the course of this thesis, due to the 
constraints of time and word limits, it will almost inevitably impact upon the evidential 
restraints outlined in this thesis. Depending upon the outcome of this process, it may be the 
judiciary who are relied upon as the primary means by which to uphold and enforce the rule 
of law in respect of matters involving intelligence which arise. If so, some encouragement 
should be taken from the wealth of domestic and international legal obligations which 
regulate the intelligence and security agencies’ actions, and the judiciary’s recent 
unwillingness to defer to the executive on national security without firstly conducting a 
proportionality exercise.  
 
As well as the executive, ISC and judiciary, it has been necessary to consider the expanding 
role of non-traditional actors within the intelligence process, who have emerged as a 
complementary and external form of oversight. Although they lack the democratic legitimacy 
and independence of the other oversight bodies, these non-traditional forms of oversight are 
often the primary means by which the public is informed about the UK intelligence and 
security agencies’ actions, and purported wrongdoing. In relation to allegations of their 
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complicity in extraordinary rendition such organisations, which include transnational, non-
governmental and media bodies, invested time and resources in uncovering coherent evidence 
relating to the CIA-led renditions cycle. A more collaborative approach between non-
traditional bodies and the other branches of state, especially the ISC, must therefore be 
encouraged in order to entrench the perception that intelligence oversight is an accessible 
area of public discourse. Concerns relating to such bodies’ relative lack of objectivity, and 
lack of appreciation for the secrecy of intelligence, may be mitigated by the contribution of 
the other branches of state to intelligence oversight, and the terms and extent of their 
collaborative relationships.   
 
It is in the agencies’ own interests to be subjected to effective and comprehensive oversight; 
this will reduce discourse about their perceived wrongdoings and keep citizens informed 
about their activities. For that reason, the heads of both MI5 and MI6 must recognise the 
importance of effective external oversight, whilst entrenching ethical behaviour within the 
agencies themselves. Criticism must not be viewed as solely negative and politically 
motivated, but as an opportunity for the agencies to adapt and improve, and thus better 
represent the state’s interests. It is encouraging that the government has taken some steps to 
update the current oversight framework, including originally commissioning the Gibson 
inquiry and producing specific guidance for the treatment and detention of detainees within 
UK custody. It is to be hoped that developments such as these will help the agencies to 
appropriately engage with and respond to the allegations made against them. However, more 
must be done to ensure that the future of intelligence oversight is provided for. If it is true 
that intimate knowledge of the agencies lies at the heart of effective oversight
589
 then there 
are several traditional and non-traditional institutions and actors within the UK intelligence 
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framework which are equipped to promote intelligence oversight and accountability. The true 
test, for these bodies and the UK intelligence and security services, will therefore be how 
they work together to ensure a collective and cohesive system of oversight within which the 
rule of law is at the centre.  
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